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Introduction 
The PLO1, KLA2 and PKK3 often summon up visions of fear, indiscriminate death and 
violent destruction.  These groups are viewed in many quarters as dissident rebels or 
'terrorists' attempting to undermine legitimate governments.  The groups themselves, 
however, have a diametrically opposing view of the situation.  These national liberation 
movements4 see themselves as 'freedom fighters'5, waging a war of national liberation6 on 
behalf of their 'people' against an established oppressive government7 to fulfil their 
legitimate right of self-determination. 
 
Conflict between a national liberation movement and an established government is a 
unique form of conflict, involving both guerrilla and regular armed warfare and 
engendering much bitterness, injury and death.  Conflict of this type also creates many 
                                                          
1 Palestine Liberation Organisation. 
2 Kosovo Liberation Army. 
3 Partia Karkaren Kurdistan - Kurdish Workers Party. 
4 Regarding the term 'national liberation movement' see Sluka's comment - The use of the term 'national 
liberation movements' has political implications, particularly when the groups so named are generally 
referred to by states and the media as 'terrorists'.  No one opposed to or critical of these movements calls 
them 'national liberation movements' because liberation (freedom) has positive value connotations for most 
people.  Nowadays, in the conservative global New Right era we live in, most academics seem to prefer the 
term 'armed separatist (or secessionist) movements', which they claim is a more objective or neutral 
description - Sluka 1996.  It is to be noted that the present discussion does not attempt to address the issue 
of terrorism.  Terrorism is an extremely controversial topic that has defied definition - see Higgins 1997, 14 
- 9.  Also see generally Laqueur, 2001.  While it is accepted that acts of terrorism have, at times, been 
committed during a war of national liberation and that a distinction must be made between an act of 
terrorism and a legitimate act of war committed during a war of national liberation, an indepth discussion 
of the phenomenon of terrorism falls outside the remit of this discussion.  
5 See Sluka 1996 - Every nation people will defend its identity and territory from breakup and eradication.  
Facing absorption and subjugation, many nations have no other choice than to militarily resist the 
colonizing / conquering states.  This is a defensive reaction.  To defend their nations from being 
annihilated, many peoples have taken up arms and engaged in wars of national liberation. 
6 A war of national liberation has been described as: the armed struggle waged by a people through its 
liberation movement against the established government to reach self-determination - Ronzitti in Cassese 
1975, 321. 
7 See Sluka 1996 - National liberation movements are 'peoples' movements seeking freedom, independence, 
and / or autonomy from what are perceived as oppressive and usually 'alien' regimes.  They are popular 
movements supported by whole communities of subjugated people, and depend on the active support of the 
population, mobilized by a revolutionary party or organisation. 
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difficult legal questions.  These intrastate struggles are difficult to define and have grave 
consequences for both the members of the national liberation movement and the armed 
forces of the government in question. 
 
Cassese believes that the term 'war of national liberation' was in use in the early 
nineteenth century,8 and indeed, the use of armed force by peoples under oppressive9 
regimes is certainly not a twentieth century phenomenon.  In fact, Sluka points out that: 
 
There have been national liberation movements since the evolution of the first 
states.  States have proven to be the most efficient of social and military 
organisations ever devised by human beings for the pursuit of conquest or 
predatory expansion.  The history of states is the history of empire, and from 
their beginning they spread by conquest and subjugation of neighbouring 
peoples until today all of the formerly independent nations or peoples have been 
conquered and included within their boundaries.10 
 
The late eighteenth century, for example, saw conflict between American settlers and 
their British rulers, while in the early nineteenth century, the Latin American countries 
fought against the rule of Spain and Portugal. However, it was in the mid-twentieth 
century, during the period of decolonisation, that the main spate of wars of national 
liberation occurred.  It was also during this period that the many inadequacies regarding 
the application of international humanitarian law to such struggles and wars came to the 
fore. 
 
It is the aim of this paper to analyse the international humanitarian law that is applicable 
to wars of national liberation and to discuss the protection afforded thereby to both 
civilians and those involved in combat.  Due to the fact that law is ever evolving, a 
chronological approach has been undertaken in this study of national liberation 
movements.  Chapter 1 of this study therefore begins with a discussion of the traditional 
international law approach to wars of national liberation, and it focuses on the concept of 
                                                          
8 Cassese in Swinarski 1984, 313. 
9 What is meant by 'oppressive' in this context is a regime that denies rights, in particular, the right of self-
determination, to a population or a portion of the population, e.g. the apartheid regime in South Africa. 
10 Sluka 1996. 
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recognition of belligerency and the protection afforded thereby to those involved in such 
a conflict. 
 
Chapter 2 concerns the development of international humanitarian law through the 
adoption of the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 194911 and the 
provisions of these Conventions that could be applicable to wars of national liberation. 
 
Chapter 3 briefly discusses the development of the principle of self-determination and the 
'internationalisation' of wars of national liberation by the United Nations (UN) and other 
regional organizations such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).  It also focuses 
on the consequences of this development at the Diplomatic Conference for the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed 
Conflicts of 1974 – 1977 and the 'hijacking' of this Conference by national liberation 
movements. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on one Protocol I,12 which was one of the main results from the 
Diplomatic Conference.  Protocol I relates to international conflicts.  It was specifically 
tailored and amended to suit national liberation movements/wars.  The impact of Protocol 
I on both the political and legal status of wars of national liberation is examined. 
 
The final Chapter focuses on the second result of the Diplomatic Conference - Protocol 
II13 regarding non-international conflicts.  It examines the possible application of this 
Protocol to situations of conflict between a national liberation movement and established 
government forces 
 
                                                          
11 1949 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, 1949 Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War.  
12 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. 
13 1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. 
 4
The main conclusion which will be drawn from this analysis is that despite the various 
provisions which could, in theory, apply to wars of national liberation, in reality, only 
very little of the formal framework of international humanitarian law is applied to this 
type of conflict.  While some States may 'concede' to apply international humanitarian 
law measures in conflicts that become widespread and sustained, this application is seen 
as mere concession out of humanitarian concern on behalf of States and not as a legal 
obligation.  Additionally, this concession usually only occurs after various attempts on 
behalf of governments to quell the insurgency by means of repressive measures, and 
sometimes, emergency legislation, have failed.14  National liberation movements seem to 
be more willing to apply and be to be bound by international humanitarian law than 
States because it is seen as a means of legitimising and gaining more support for their 
'cause' on the world stage.  This paper would, however, ultimately seek to illustrate the 
failure of the international community to properly implement the formal framework of 
international humanitarian law in wars of national liberation. 
                                                          
14 See Wilson 1988, 179. 
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Chapter 1:  The Traditional International Law Approach to Wars of 
National Liberation 
The aim of this chapter is to identify and to analyse the laws that were applicable to wars 
of national liberation prior to 1949 when the Geneva Conventions15 were adopted.  The 
main wars of national liberation took place in the middle and second half of the twentieth 
century but, many conflicts took place before this time, where armed groups rose up 
against their established governments.  Only some of these conflicts triggered the 
application of humanitarian law, and other conflicts remained within the scope of 
application of municipal criminal law only.    
 
Traditional international law distinguishes between three categories, or indeed, stages, of 
challenges to established state authority.  On an ascending scale of intensity of the 
challenge to the government, these categories are: 1. rebellion, 2. insurgency and 3. 
belligerency.  An analysis of these categories and the requirements needed to be fulfilled 
before a conflict could satisfy the threshold of any particular category is of central 
importance.  As pointed out by Falk16, the rights and obligations of parties to a conflict 
are first decided by the status of the factions in a conflict.  The following section analyses 
how wars of national liberation were, and indeed could have been, treated under 




The first of these categories, rebellion, involves merely sporadic and isolated challenges 
to the legitimate authority, conferring neither rights nor duties on the rebels.  A rebellion 
comes within the exclusive remit of the sovereign State, even if a state of rebellion is 
recognised by a third State.  Rebels can legally be treated as criminals under domestic 
law and, if captured, do not enjoy prisoner of war status.  Any assistance from a third 
                                                          
15 1949 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, 1949 Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War.  
16 Falk in Rosenau 1964, 197. 
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State is prohibited by traditional international law as unlawful intervention and 
interference with State sovereignty, thus rebels have no protection under international 
law.  As Falk comments: 
A presumption in favour of stability in the world allows foreign states to 
intervene on behalf of the incumbent in the situation of mere rebellion.  
However, if the intrastate conflict is sustained in time and place, it becomes 
interventionary, according to the traditional theory, to help either faction.17 
 
The criteria of rebellion are, however, quite vague and uncertain and the term 'rebellion' 
can cover many instances of minor conflicts within a State from violent single-issue 




The second of these categories, insurgency, is of a more serious nature than rebellion.  
Unfortunately, as with rebellion, traditional international law offers no exact definition of 
insurgency, and this leaves much confusion surrounding this issue.  There are two 
schools of thought regarding the status of insurgents in international law.20  Some 
scholars such as Higgins and Greenspan are of the opinion that the conferring of the 
status of 'insurgents' on a group brings them out of the remit of municipal law and firmly 
onto the international law forum, whereas others such as Castren are of the opinion that 
the status of insurgency does not confer any rights or duties on the group and that they 
are still subject to municipal criminal law.21  However, it does seem to be the case that 
the status of insurgency brings the group involved out of the exclusive realm of domestic 
law, giving them quasi-international law status.  Falk is of the opinion that insurgency is: 
 
                                                          
17 Ibid, 206. 
18 Ibid, 199.  See also ibid, 198. 
19 See ibid, 198 - 9:  International law thus purports to give no protection to participants in a rebellion.  
Rebellion usefully covers minor instances of internal war of a wide variety; violent protest involving a 
single issue (Indian language riots, Soviet food riots) or an uprising that is so rapidly suppressed as to 
warrant no acknowledgement of its existence on an extranation level (East European rebellions against 
Soviet dominion in 1953 and 1956).  These norms of identification are, however, vague and seldom serve 
expressis verbis to adjust the relation between the rebellion as a state of affairs and international actors 
affected in various ways by its existence. 
20 See Wilson 1988, 25. 
21 See Wilson’s discussion of these opinions - ibid, 25 – 7. 
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...a catch-all designation provided by international law to allow states to 
determine the quantum of legal relations to be established with the insurgents.  It 
is an international acknowledgement of the existence of an internal war but it 
leaves each state substantially free to control the consequences of this 
acknowledgement.22 
 
While the threshold of insurgency is unclear, it seems to be the case that insurgency 
constitutes a civil disturbance which is usually confined to a limited area of the State's 
territory and is supported by a minimum degree of organisation.23  An analysis of the law 
concerning insurgency leads to the conclusion that certain characteristics must attach to 
rebels for them to be recognised as insurgents.24  These characteristics are:  sufficient 
control over territory and requisite military force to incur interest of foreign States 
because of the possibility of the actions of the insurgents having an adverse effect on 
foreign States.  Much academic attention has been focused on the rights and obligations 
of insurgents but as Wilson points out,25 there seems to be general agreement that the 
rights of insurgents are limited to the territorial boundaries of the State involved.  
Insurgents are, for example, allowed to enter into general agreements and arrange for 
humanitarian protection through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).26 
However, it is also generally agreed that other rights, such as the right to blockade, which 
attach to belligerents, do not, in fact, also attach to insurgents.27  Menon says of 
insurgency: 
On the outbreak of insurrection in any country, other States generally maintain 
an attitude of non-interference in the domestic affairs of that country.  However, 
it may frequently render it not possible for third States to maintain an attitude of 
indifference for an unduly long period of time and treat the insurrection merely 
as internecine struggle.  Depending upon the geographical situation of the 
country, the disturbed state of affairs may have deep impact on the trade or 
commercial relations, in particular maritime interests, of the third States and 
those States may be forced to declare their attitude towards the rebels.  Under 
the normal circumstances, this gives no cause for any offence to the established 
government of the country; nor is this declaration a violation of neutrality.28 
 
Therefore, insurgency could be seen to partially internationalise a conflict / a rebellion 
without fully bringing it to the standard of belligerency.  As Menon comments, 
                                                          
22 Falk in Rosenau 1964, 199.  See also Menon 1994, 110 and 123. 
23 See Menon 1994, 110. 
24 See Wilson 1988, 24. 
25 Ibid, 25. 
26 Regarding insurgent rights, see Falk in Rosenau 1964, 200. 
27 See Wilson 1988, 24 - 5. 
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insurgency is a status of potential belligerency.29  However, as Schlindler points out, 
recognition of insurgency is, in fact, a very rare occurrence.  He says: 
 
Recognition of insurgents has mainly been substituted by Article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention and, in some cases, by unilateral declarations of parties to a conflict made 
upon the request of the ICRC, to the effect that for a specific conflict they would agree to 
apply certain principles of the humanitarian law.  This happened, for example, in Algeria 
(1955 - 1962), in the Congo (1962 - 1964), in the Yemen (1962 - 1967) and in Nigeria 




Belligerency is the final category of a challenge to the established government recognised 
by traditional international law, and involves a conflict of a more serious nature than 
either rebellion or insurgency.31 It is also a more clearly defined concept of international 
law than either of the other categories of conflict.  Recognition of belligerency formalises 
the rights and duties of all parties to a war.    It is... 
 
...the acknowledgement of a juridical fact that there exists a state of hostilities 
between two groups contending for power or authority; it is...the recognition of 
the existence of war.32  
 
In order for a conflict to pass into the category of belligerency however, certain 
characteristics must attach to it.  Schlindler discusses the criteria laid down by the Institut 
de Droit International in 1900.  He says that for a state of belligerency to be recognised it 
was necessary that: 
 
(1) the insurgents had occupied a certain part of the State territory;  (2) 
established a government which exercised the rights inherent in sovereignty on 
that part of territory; and (3) if they conducted the hostilities by organized troops 
kept under military discipline and complying with the laws and customs of 
war.33  Thus, insurgents could only be recognized if the hostilities had assumed 
the attributes of war.34 
                                                                                                                                                                             
28 Menon 1994, 111. 
29 Ibid, 137. 
30 Schlindler 1979, 146. 
31 The distinction between insurgency and belligerency is discussed by Fuller, CJ in The Three Friends, 166 
(US) 1897, 63. 
32 Menon 1994, 110. 
33 See Resolution on Insurrection adopted by the Institut de Droit International in 1900, Annuaire de 
l'Institut de droit international, 1900, 227. 
34 Schlindler 1979, 145. 
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Higgins describes the criteria as: 
 
...first, the existence within a state of a widely spread armed conflict; second, the 
occupation and administration by rebels of a substantial portion of territory; 
thirdly, the conduct of hostilities in accordance with the rules of war and through 
armed forces responsible to an identifiable authority; and fourth, the existence of 
circumstances which make it necessary for third parties to define their attitude 
by acknowledging the status of belligerency.35 
 
Menon points out that recognition of belligerency as a specific institution as we know it 
today probably originated in the first quarter of the nineteenth century when text-writers 
started discussing the status granted by both the British and the United States 
Governments to the revolting Spanish colonies.36  While the situation regarding 
recognition of belligerency is more concretely defined than that regarding either rebellion 
or insurgency, there is still some vagueness and uncertainty surrounding this subject.37  
The rights and duties of belligerents are, however, clearer, and as Wilson opines 
'[r]ecognition of belligerency gives insurgents rights and duties in international law 
analogous to those of States.'38 
 
Once a state of belligerency has been recognised, the belligerent group becomes a subject 
of international law.  The belligerent group then incurs some, but not all, of the rights and 
obligations of States - this includes the rights and duties of international humanitarian 
law.  Recognition of belligerency can be granted by either the 'parent State' or a third 
State.  Recognising a state of belligerency conferred very little advantage on the third 
State and therefore was not usually forthcoming.  With regard to the motives of 
recognition of belligerency by third States, Moir states that: 
 
The most obvious reason could be that the recognising State did in fact support 
the aims for which the rebels were fighting.  Political motives and self-interest 
are, after all, the foundation upon which much of State practice has historically 
been built.  In this respect, it may also have made good sense since victorious 
                                                          
35 Higgins in Luard 1972, 170 -1.  See also Moir 1998, 346 - 7. 
36 Menon 1994, 136. 
37 See Prize Cases (1862) 2 Black 635 - US Supreme Court. 
38 Wilson 1988, 26 - 7.  For a discussion of the rights of belligerents on the High Seas see The Three 
Friends, (1896) 166 US 1. 
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insurgents may well consider the recognition afforded when deciding on future 
foreign relations.39 
 
Recognition of belligerency by the 'parent State' which was taken to be at the discretion 
of that State, was also very rarely forthcoming as any State would be unwilling to 
recognise belligerency until they had tried to quell the conflict to the best of their ability.  
Therefore, recognition of a state of belligerency by the 'parent State', if it came at all, 
came at an advanced stage of the conflict and only after the 'parent State' believed that 
their own forces needed to benefit from the principle of reciprocity in the conduct of 
hostilities.40  'Parent States' were often reluctant to recognise belligerency because if a 
state of belligerency was recognised within its territory, both its own forces and the 
belligerent forces had the same rights and were under the same obligations, which could, 
in theory, prolong the conflict as the government would no longer be able to use all of the 
power at its disposal.  Recognition could also be regarded by the 'parent State' as some 
sort of concession to the rebels and a sign of weakness on the part of the government,41 
even if the State's armed forces would benefit from better treatment during hostilities and 
in the event of capture if belligerency was recognised. 
 
If belligerency was recognised by either a third State or by the 'parent State', this was 
analogous to the recognition of a war between two sovereign States under international 
law, which meant that any intervention by a third State on behalf of either the legitimate 
government or the insurgent was an act of aggression against the other.  Menon discusses 
the difficulties regarding recognition: 
Once the insurrection acquires sufficient force and permanency, recognition of 
belligerency thus appears to be justifiable in the eyes of international law.  
However, recognition given too early may be tantamount to intervention and 
lead to international friction.  Premature recognition is therefore looked upon by 
the parent State as a gratuitous demonstration of sympathy which may amount to 
an unfriendly act.  Consequently, the authorities are unanimous in emphasizing 
the necessity for caution on the part of foreign States.42 
 
                                                          
39 Moir 1998, 342.  Moir also points out that belligerency was most often recognised in maritime situations 
- often when the legitimate authority placed a blockade on 'insurgent' ports. 
40 See Moir 1998, 343. 
41 See ibid, 343. 
42 Menon, 1994 136 – 7. 
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The problems regarding recognition of belligerency are therefore, obviously quite 
numerous.  As Moir comments, this led to a reluctance to recognise and an unpredictable 
practice and pattern of recognition: 
 
…the laws of war were not automatically applicable to internal armed conflict in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  States may have observed them in 
some cases through the doctrine of recognition of belligerency (either tacit or 
express), but this was done out of self-interest and for practical purposes, rather 
than through the belief that they were so bound by international law.  Even on 
the occasions when recognition was afforded, it was a concession to the 
insurgents, certainly not a legal entitlement.  Had State practice been uniform, it 
might have demonstrated an emerging customary law trend to apply 
humanitarian law automatically to internal conflicts, but States did not feel 
legally obliged to recognize belligerency...43 
 
As with insurgency, however, belligerency has not, in fact, been recognised in any 
conflict in many years.  This is despite the fact that many conflicts such as the Nigeria-
Biafra conflict in 1967, the Algerian conflict and the civil war in Nicaragua,44 would have 
reached the threshold of belligerency.  This leads Higgins to comment that '…recognition 
of this status has lost all practical significance.'45 
 
 
Traditional International Law and Wars of National Liberation 
What recognition, if any, could wars of national liberation gain under these categories of 
conflicts of international law?  Wars of national liberation take multifarious forms, from 
sporadic riots to sustained and concerted use of force against the established government.  
Therefore, the merits of each individual war of national liberation would have to be 
examined in order to deduce whether the threshold for insurgency or belligerency has 
been passed, and deduce whether the application of international law should be triggered. 
Of course, as discussed above, one of the problems with this is the lack of clear and 
definite criteria for the recognition of insurgency.  Indeed, while belligerent status is 
more easily defined, some uncertainty still persists in this area also.  The second major 
obstacle to the application of the status of belligerency to wars of national liberation is 
the reluctance of all States to admit that they have a serious conflict occurring within 
                                                          
43 Moir 1998, 350. 
44 See Schlindler 1979, 145 - 6. 
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their borders.  Firstly, this would show that the situation was out of control and that the 
central government could no longer deal with it.  Secondly, an admission of this sort  – 
that the groups of rebels actually were belligerents recognised by international law –
would give legitimacy to their challenge to the established government.  However, 
recognition of insurgency, or preferably, belligerency, was the only way in which those 
engaged in a war of national liberation were entitled to jus in bello under traditional 
international law.  Recognition of belligerency would especially have been of great 
importance to such insurgents in order to offer some humanitarian protection to the 
'freedom fighters' and to limit casualties of war.  Moir points out that: 
 
An examination of some major internal conflicts of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries shows that, in those cases where the laws of war were 
accepted and applied by opposing forces, some form of recognition of 
belligerency had invariably taken place.  In contrast, where recognition of 
belligerency was not afforded by the government, the laws of war tended not to 
be applied, leading to barbaric conduct by both sides.46 
 
He goes on to state that '…recognition of belligerency tended to encourage the 
observance of the humanitarian rules of warfare, whereas an absence of recognition did 
the opposite.'47 
 
Some national liberation movements would have come very close to attaining, if not 
passing, the threshold required for belligerency by satisfying the necessary criteria as 
discussed by Schlindler and Higgins above.  Yet the fact remains that a state of 
belligerency has never been recognised in a war of national liberation.  Therefore, as 
Wilson comments, '…[d]iscussion of what rights and duties are applicable under 
traditional international law when belligerency of a national liberation movement is 
recognised is highly theoretical and devoid of practice in support of theory.'48 
   
Prior to 1949, 'rebels' / members of national liberation movements were mainly dealt with 
as criminals under municipal law.  This was the common practice of States before 
                                                                                                                                                                             
45 Higgins in Luard 1972, 171. 
46 Moir 1998, 345. 
47 Moir 1998, 346. 
48 Wilson 1988, 37. 
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international humanitarian law dealt with non-international conflicts in Common Article 
3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.49  However, if the conflict / 'rebellion' was in any way 
protracted, governments often softened or moderated their position in order to afford 
some protection or benefits to those engaged in combat against the established 
government.  The first attempt to codify this approach is to be found in Francis Lieber's 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field50, which was 
formulated for use in the US civil war.  This war has been called the first war of the 
'modern era'.51 During the course of this non-international conflict, 'combatants' on both 
sides were generally treated as legitimate combatants and were also treated as prisoners-
of-war if captured.  The Boer War also saw captured Boers treated as prisoners-of-war by 
the British until the annexation of the Boer Republics.52  
 
This behaviour by established governments was, however, a matter of courtesy, not 
obligation and was not always afforded. An example of where an established government 
did not honour this commitment was the behaviour of the Greek government during the 
Greek Civil War of 1946 to 1949.  As Wilson comments: 
 
The record of State practice when confronting organized resistance movements 
or secessionist movements is not entirely Draconian.  Governments may 
eventually treat captured persons in an internal armed conflict as prisoners of 
war, even if they do not recognize them as such.  It was generally agreed that 
according to accepted principles of international law there was no obligation for 
them to do so, and no government granting analogous treatment to captured 
prisoners prior to the 1949 Geneva Conventions in an internal armed conflict 
where the rebels were not recognized as insurgents claimed to do so out of any 





This analysis illustrates that prior to 1949, traditional international law was not very well 
equipped to deal with armed challenges to established government authority.  While 
traditional international law does provide for a categorisation of challenges to State 
                                                          
49 This will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
50 D. van Nostrand, New York, 1863. 
51 See Wilson 1988, 38. 
52 See ibid, 38. 
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authority, a lack of clarity, political will, and State practice means that these categories – 
rebellion, insurgency and belligerency – are not of much practical use.  The only means 
whereby a conflict arising from a challenge to an established government could be dealt 
with under traditional international law was recognition of belligerency.  While provision 
was made in traditional international law for the application of jus in bello to certain 
challenges which attained this rather illusive status of belligerency, none of these 
challenges were in the form of a war of national liberation.  Prior to 1949, 'freedom 
fighters' were largely dealt with under the banner of municipal law. The only concession 
made to 'combatants' in wars of national liberation e.g. treatment analogous to prisoners-
of-war in the event of capture, was at the total discretion of the parent State, and was not 
always forthcoming.  By 1949, there was, therefore, an obvious need for a change in 
international law regarding non-international conflicts and indeed, wars of  
national liberation. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
53 Ibid, 41. 
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Chapter 2:  The Application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to Wars 
of National Liberation 
Traditional international law did not offer adequate protection to victims of non-
international armed conflicts and, as discussed in the previous Chapter, wars of national 
liberation were, to all intents and purposes, ignored by this law.  It was not until the 
adoption of the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 194954 that 
provisions of international humanitarian law could be seen to be applicable to wars of 
national liberation.  The four Conventions of 1949, focusing on the wounded and sick on 
land and at sea, prisoners of war and civilians, apply to conflicts of an international 
character, i.e. conflicts between two High Contracting Parties.  There is but one exception 
among the provisions to this scope of application - Article 3 of the four Conventions, 
which extends the scope of protection to those involved in conflicts of a non-international 
character.55  The classification of a war of national liberation as an international or a non-
international conflict is of central importance with regard to the Geneva Conventions and 
the protection of the wars victims.  If a war of national liberation can be regarded as a 
conflict of an international character, then the whole jus in bello of the Conventions - 
c.400 articles - applies to the conflict.  However, if a war of national liberation is 
considered to be a non-international conflict, it is only the 'rudimentary rules'56 of Article 
3 of the four Conventions which will apply, thus greatly limiting the protection afforded 
to those involved in such a conflict.  The aim of this chapter is to examine the extent to 
which the provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply to wars of national liberation and 
to analyse the application, or lack thereof, of these provisions to conflicts of this kind. 
 
 
                                                          
54 1949 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, 1949 Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War.  
55 Regarding the Geneva Conventions and Common Article 2, Rwelamira comments: 
The only mitigation to this rigorous provision was mildly provided for in common Article 3, which 
specified certain minimum standards to be applied in internal conflicts, i.e. wars of non-international 
character.  Common Article 3 required parties to the conflict to be guided by considerations of humanity 
towards each other - Rwelamira in Swinarski 1984, 230. 
56 Schlindler 1979, 126. 
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The Geneva Conventions of 1949 
The adoption of the Geneva Conventions dramatically altered the way in which the 
international community viewed, and dealt with, 'war'.  The Geneva Conventions deal 
with both declared war and all other armed conflicts between States regardless of the 
intensity of the conflict,57 unlike the traditional international law framework discussed in 
Chapter 1.  Under the Geneva Conventions, there are now just two categories of conflict - 
international and non-international. 
 
Wars of National Liberation as International Conflicts 
The question has been raised whether wars of national liberation could, in any way, be 
covered by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and indeed, it has been argued that national 
liberation movements could benefit and be bound by these Conventions under certain 
conditions.58  Even though the Conventions are, in principle, open only to States, they 
contain two provisions regarding accession to the Conventions or acceptance of the 
Conventions that could be of use to national liberation movements and allow for the 
application of the Conventions to wars of national liberation.  The first provision is 
Common Article 60/59/139/155 regarding accession to the Conventions.  This states: 
 
From the date of its coming in force, it shall be open to any Power in whose 
name the present Convention has not yet been signed, to accede to this 
Convention. 
 
The second provision is Article 2(3) common to the four Conventions.  This provision 
states: 
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present 
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their 
mutual relations.  They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation 
to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof. 
 
If the terms 'Power' or 'Powers' in these two provisions can be taken to encompass 
national liberation movements then these movements could accede to, or accept to be 
bound by, the Geneva Conventions under either Common Article 60/59/139/155 or 
                                                          
57 See Common Article 2 (1). 
58 See Abi-Saab, 1972, 104. 
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Common Article 2(3) thus bringing the whole corpus of jus in bello into application over 
wars of national liberation. 
 
This rather liberal interpretation of the above provisions is not without its critics.  It was 
not the intention of the drafters of the 1949 Conventions to allow for the above 
interpretation, with the term 'Power' intended to be restricted to mean States only.59  The 
main spate of wars of national liberation did not take place until the 1960s and were 
therefore, obviously, not to the fore of the debate on the application of the Conventions in 
1949.  As Cassese comments: 
It...seems plausible to argue that in 1949 the States gathered at Geneva neither 
took wars of national liberation into account nor envisaged the possibility for 
national liberation movements to become a contracting party to the Conventions 
or at any rate to be allowed to be bound by them.60 
  
Schlindler also tackles the problem of the application of the Geneva Conventions to wars 
of national liberation.  He questions whether, despite the fact that it was not the intention 
of the drafters that the Conventions would apply to wars of national liberation, they could 
be seen as 'Powers' within the meaning of the above-quoted provisions.  He comments: 
 
The fact that in 1949 the authors of the Conventions considered colonial wars 
non-international conflicts in the sense of Article 3 cannot be decisive in this 
respect.  For the conception in the minds of the authors of a treaty is not relevant 
to its later interpretation. 61   
 
He refers to Article 51 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 196962 to 
support this theory.  This provision states that a treaty is to be interpreted with regard to 
the ordinary meaning conferred on its terms in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.  He then goes on to comment that: 
 
If the term 'Power' is interpreted according to the objective and purpose of the 
Geneva Conventions, it does not seem out of question to regard a liberation 
movement as a 'Power'.   ...an insurgent party can become a subject under the 
laws of war, although only upon recognition.  Similarly, it is by no means 
                                                          
59 In the opinion of the creators of the Conventions of 1949, wars which today are characterized as wars of 
liberation were considered as non-international conflicts.  The territory of the colonies was looked upon as 
part of the territory of the mother country - See Pictet 1952, Vol. III, p. 37. 
60 Cassese in Swinarski 1984, 316. 
61 Schlindler 1979, 135. 
62 United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 1155, 331. 
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excluded that a liberation movement which enjoys a large recognition may 
become a 'Power'.63 
 
How would a liberation movement prove that it was, in fact, a 'Power' within the meaning 
of the Geneva Conventions?  If, for example, a liberation movement exerted power over a 
certain territory which was administered by the 'parent' State as in the case of a colony, a 
mandate or a trust territory,64 this could serve to 'internationalise' the conflict, bringing it 
within the scope of the Geneva Conventions.  However, for this to be the case, the 
liberation movement would have to enjoy, as Schlindler points out, 'large recognition' and 
indeed, the support of the civilian population.   
 
Wars of National Liberation as Non-international Conflicts - Common Article 3 
As stated above, in 1949 wars of national liberation were regarded as purely non-
international conflicts or indeed, civil wars, thus falling outside the scope of application 
of all provisions of the Geneva Conventions except for Common Article 3.  Prior to 
World War II, the attention of the laws of war was focused almost exclusively on 
conflicts between States, i.e. on international conflicts.  It was realised, however, that 
civil wars were becoming more prevalent and that some form of regulation of conflicts of 
a non-international nature was necessary.  This change in attitude brought about an 
evolution in the laws of war, which up to then had placed all the emphasis on State 
sovereignty - these laws now try to limit State sovereignty in the interests of the 
individual.65 
 
This was one of the more controversial issues to be dealt with at the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference whose goal was to revise the Geneva Conventions.  While traditional 
international law had always held that internal conflicts were to be dealt with only under 
municipal law, one of the aims of the 1949 Conference was to bring non-international 
conflicts within the jurisdiction of the laws of war.  In the year prior to this Diplomatic 
Conference the ICRC prepared the Draft Conventions for the Protection of War Victims 
                                                          
63 Schlindler 1979, 135. 
64 See ibid, 136. 
65 See Suter 1984, 15. 
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and submitted them to the 17th International Red Cross Conference at Stockholm.  These 
Draft Conventions saw a 4th paragraph being added to Common Article 2, which stated: 
 
In all cases of armed conflict which are not of an international character, 
especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion, which may 
occur in the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties, the 
implementing of the principles of the present Convention shall be obligatory on 
each of the adversaries.  The application of the Convention in these 
circumstances shall in no way depend on the legal status of the Parties to the 
conflict and shall have no effect on that status.66  
 
However, this provision met with resistance both in Stockholm and at the Diplomatic 
Conference, because, as Abi-Saab comments: 
 
One of the main concerns of its opponents was that in spite of the express formal 
denial of any effect of such an integral application on the legal status of the 
parties to the conflict, the possibility such a solution opens to 'rebels' to appoint 
another State as 'protecting Power' would inexorably internationalize the 
conflict.67 
 
The attempt to extend the laws of war to non-international armed conflicts eventually 
resulted in the 'daring and paradoxical'68 Common Article 3, so-called because it is 
common to all four of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.  This article states that: 
 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall 
be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
 
(I)Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a)violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
  (b)taking of hostages; 
(c)outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
(d)the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
                                                          
66 See Pictet, Commentary of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Vol. III, Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, ICRC, 1960, 31. 
67 Abi-Saab 1988, 220. 
68 Suter 1984, 15. 
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(2)The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by 
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present 
Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the 
Parties to the conflict.  
 
 
Analysis of Common Article 3 
Common Article 3 has been described as a 'milestone in the development of the law of 
war'.69  This 'convention in miniature'70 was the first attempt to legally regulate non-
international conflicts in treaty law.  It was an attempt to face the reality of the situation 
of the time with the prevalence of civil conflicts taking place in various parts of the 
world.  This provision seeks to apply the most basic principles enshrined in the Geneva 
Conventions to non-international conflicts, yet falls far short of the application of the 
whole corpus of international humanitarian law.  While Common Article 3 is similar to 
the full range of provisions contained in the Geneva Conventions in that it extends 
protection to those involved in non-international conflicts, this protection is much less 
than that afforded in situations of international conflicts. 
 
There are many criticisms to be made of Common Article 3.  As Wilson points out 
'[a]rticle 3 does not prevent the established government from punishing the rebels under 
municipal law, nor does it change their status in law.'71 
 
This means that the established government can attempt to suppress a rebellion and can 
still hold the rebels accountable under municipal law.  Those 'freedom fighters' detained 
as prisoners must, under the provision, be treated 'humanely' but can still be punished and 
even put to death after a trial under municipal law. 
 
                                                          
69 Wilson 1988, 43. 
70 Ibid, 44. 
71 Ibid, 28. 
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Another weak point of Common Article 3 is that neither the means and methods of war 
nor the conduct of hostilities are limited with the article being restricted to protection of 
those persons not taking part in the conflict.  Also, while humanitarian aid is expressly 
allowed under Common Article 3, this aid is quite limited. 
 
One of the biggest failings of Common Article 3 is the uncertainty surrounding its 
application.  Because this provision's application is automatic, no 'recognition' is 
necessary and therefore, 'target conflicts' are not easily identifiable.  Common Article 3 
does not provide for a competent authority that can decide if a particular conflict 
constitutes a 'Common Article 3 conflict'. 
 
Also quite controversial regarding Common Article 3 is the lack of special provisions for 
guerrilla warfare.  Many, if not most, internal conflicts involve this type of warfare yet it 
is not taken into account by Article 3. 
 
G.I.A.D. Draper describes the difficulties that were faced at the Diplomatic Conference 
when the drafting of the provision of non-international conflicts came up for discussion.72  
The committee that was charged with the formulation of the non-international conflict 
provision had to meet on 25 occasions before a consensus was reached.  Various drafts 
were debated and dismissed before a final proposal was agreed upon.  Draper states that: 
 
The limitations and defects of the final Article 3 must be seen in the light of this 
drafting history.  Its conclusion was an achievement and its defects are the price.  
The anxieties and the caution of states in negotiating this article have been more 
than borne out by the events which have occurred since the conventions were 
established.  It is probably true to say that Article 3 has been the object of more 
attention and dispute than any other provision in the conventions.  Apart from 
the intrinsic sensitivity of the subject matter, the political events of the post-
1949 period have more often than not manifested themselves in some form of 
internal armed conflict within a state.73 
 
                                                          
72 See Draper, 'The Geneva Conventions of 1949' in Académie de Droit International, Receueil des Cours, 
Vol. 1, 1965 - quoted in Suter 1984, 19. 
73 Ibid, 19. 
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Higgins concludes regarding Common Article 3 that '[t]he Article itself is certainly a step 
in the right direction - its application is not based on reciprocity by the other party, nor 
does it depend upon the fulfillment of a technical definition of a civil war.'74 
 
While Common Article 3 is to be welcomed as an improvement on the traditional 
international law approach to non-international conflicts, the issue of the threshold of its 
application must be addressed before a proper assessment of the provision can be made. 
 
Threshold of Common Article 3 
Probably the most unsatisfactory dimension of this provision is the uncertainty of the 
threshold of its application, with the term of 'armed conflict not of an international 
character' not being defined75. There is much uncertainty concerning the threshold of 
violence necessary before a conflict can be regarded as being a non-international conflict 
under the Geneva Convention for the purposes of Common Article 3.  In order for a war 
of national liberation to be covered by Article 3, what attributes must it have?  The 
vagueness of Article 3 does allow for interpretation and the possibility of wars of national 
liberation falling within the scope of this article.  Suter is of the opinion that if a group of 
guerrillas can prove that they represent a threat to the survival of the government by the 
use of high-level and sustained force then a civil disturbance can take on the character of 
a non-international conflict.76  Suter also states that: 
 
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions was not clearly applicable to guerrilla 
warfare and its provisions were vague enough to permit a variety of 
interpretations even in a conventional non-international conflict.  On the other 
hand, in a more general sense it was useful in enabling governments to become 
accustomed to the principle of non-international conflicts being regulated by 
international law.77 
   
This lack of clarity regarding the concept of an armed conflict not of an international 
character could be regarded as the 'greatest barrier'78 to the application of this provision.  
It can be assumed, however, that the threshold for the application of Common Article 3 is 
                                                          
74 Higgins in Luard 1972, 183. 
75 See Suter 1984, 16. 
76 See Ibid, 16. 
77 Ibid, 17. 
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less than that for recognised belligerency discussed in Chapter 1.  Recognition of 
belligerency would bring the whole corpus of humanitarian law, not just the minimum 
rules of Common Article 3, into application.  However, below this threshold, lies a range 
of conflicts, from unsustained sporadic challenges to State authority to insurgency, which 
could, conceivably, come within the remit of Common Article 3.79 
 
 
Common Article 3 and Traditional International Law 
The approach of Common Article 3 differs in three aspects from the traditional approach 
of international law to recognition of belligerency, discussed in Chapter 1.  Firstly, 
Common Article 3 is to be applied automatically to conflicts of a non-international 
character, with no requirement of recognition of belligerency which caused many 
problems in the traditional international law approach as discussed in the previous 
chapter.  Indeed, there is not even a requirement of reciprocity of the application of the 
provisions of Common Article 3.  Common Article 3 also requires a lower intensity of 
armed conflict than had been necessary in order for the recognition of belligerents in 
traditional international law.  In conjunction with this, it is not required that the 
'combatants' exercise control over any amount of territory or that they have the 
characteristic of a government.  Thirdly, with recognition of belligerency, the whole 
corpus of jus in bello became applicable to the conflict, whereas Common Article 3 
contains only the minimum protection. 
 
Wars of National Liberation and Common Article 3 
How does Common Article 3 impact wars of national liberation?  Firstly, because the 
provision concerns non-international conflicts, there is the presumption that one of the 
parties to the conflict is not a State and therefore, the question of whether a national 
liberation movement can come without the remit of this provision is easily answered in 
the affirmative.  Secondly, it is conceivable that this provision could apply to such a 
conflict, with the threshold for Common Article 3 not even being as high as that for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
78 Wilson 1988, 45. 
79 Ibid, 45. 
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recognition of belligerency.  However, it must be reiterated that the protection that would 
be afforded to those involved in wars of national liberation under Common Article 3 is of 
the most minimalist nature.  While a High Contracting Party is under an explicit 
obligation to afford the protection guaranteed by Article 3 to those involved in a non-
international conflict against them (possibly a national liberation movement), Common 
Article 3 also states that: 
 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by 
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present 
Conventions.80 
 
This means that if a national liberation movement was deemed to come within the scope 
of Common Article 3, it and the 'parent State' are also encouraged to apply all the other 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions relating to international armed conflicts, thus 
offering a much broader base of protection to those involved in wars of national 
liberation, including a limit on the means and methods of warfare and on the conduct of 
hostilities.  
 
Instances of Application of the Geneva Conventions to Wars of National Liberation 
Again, as with recognition of liberation movements as belligerents, this discussion 
regarding the application of the Geneva Conventions to wars of national liberation, is of 
more theoretical than analytical value as there have been very few situations when the 
Geneva Conventions were deemed to be applicable to conflicts of this kind.  While the 
case for the application of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions regarding 
international conflicts may be seen to be quite a liberal approach to the debate as 
application to wars of national liberation was not foreseen, or even contemplated, when 
the Conventions were being drafted in 1949, it is still an option which could be 
considered by both States and national liberation movements.  Some conflicts have been 
of such an intense character that States have felt compelled to apply international 
humanitarian law.  However, this application is seen to be an act of humanitarianism, not 
a legal obligation.  National liberation movements have been more willing to apply and to 
declare their intention to apply the Geneva Conventions than 'parent States' in an effort to 
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'internationalise' and legitimise their struggle and their 'cause'.  Of course, national 
liberation movements would also hope that their adhesion to international humanitarian 
law would be reciprocated by the State.  For example, in both 1956 and 1958, the 
National Liberation Front of Algeria (FLN) declared its intention to apply the Geneva 
Convention on Prisoners of War to French prisoners and gave orders to its soldiers to 
comply with international humanitarian law.  The Gouvernement Provisoire de la 
République Algérienne (GPRA) notified the depositary of the Geneva Conventions, the 
Swiss government, of its accession to the Geneva Conventions in 1960.  The Swiss then 
notified the other High Contracting Parties of the Conventions but made a reservation to 
the accession because it did not recognise the GPRA.81  The French government, for its 
part, had actually recognised the applicability of Common Article 3 to the Algerian War 
in 1956, but, as Wilson comments:  'This was at least partially because the FLN 
threatened reprisals if executions of captured FLN members continued.'82 
  
Another situation in which the Geneva Conventions were applied to what could be 
considered a war of national liberation was the conflict surrounding the secession of 
Biafra in 1966.  Here, however, the government never formally recognised the 
application of the Geneva Conventions, not even Common Article 3.  The Nigerian 
Federal government had issued a code of conduct to its troops that required them to treat 
Biafran prisoners as prisoners-of-war.  Orders were also given to protect civilians, 
religious buildings etc.  The Red Cross also regularly visited federal government-held 
prisoners.83 
 
For many years, Portugal had refused to recognise the applicability of any of the Geneva 
Conventions, even Common Article 3, to the conflicts in its territories of Guinea-Bissau, 
Angola and Mozambique and they implemented only municipal criminal law to try to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
80 Common Article 3 (2). 
81 See Wilson 1988, 51. 
82 Ibid, 153. 
83 Ibid, 154 - 5. 
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quell the conflicts.  However, after 1974, this stance changed and Portugal even invited 
the ICRC to visit its prisoners-of-war.84 
 
As seen above, the attempt made by the FLN to accede to the Geneva Conventions was 
met with a reservation by the Swiss Government.  The situation was even more 
disappointing with regard to the attempted accession of the PLO.  In 1969, the PLO 
communicated to the Swiss Federal Political Department that they were willing to accede 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on condition of reciprocity.  However, the Swiss did not 
even communicate this offer of accession to the High Contracting Parties because they 
believed that the PLO was not a Party as it did not govern its own territory, and at this 
stage it had not formed its own provisional government.85  National liberation movements 
will be met with obstacles to their accession to the Geneva Conventions,86 however, that 
does not stop them from declaring their intention to apply and be bound by these 
Conventions, e.g. the ANC87 made a statement to the ICRC in 1980 regarding their 
willingness to apply the 1949 Conventions88, as did SWAPO89 in 1981.   Another case of 
a declaration of applicability of the Geneva Conventions came from the provisional 
government established in the Western Sahara by the Polisario - SDAR.  The ICRC has 




The above analysis shows the many difficulties to be faced by national liberation 
movements in their attempt to have the Geneva Conventions applied to wars of national 
liberation.  States had been very unwilling to apply the Conventions and only do so as a 
concession and if the principle of reciprocity is considered necessary - a legal obligation 
incumbent on States to apply the Geneva Conventions is not accepted, which makes for a 
                                                          
84 See ibid, 156. 
85 See von Tangen Page 1998, 38. 
86 See Wolf 1984, 40. 
87 African National Congress. 
88 See Wolf 1984, 39 - 40. 
89 South West Africa people's Organisation. 
90 See Wilson 1988, 157. 
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very unpredictable and unsatisfactory pattern of application.91  The main 'concessions' 
made by Governments in wars of national liberation of a high intensity is to treat 
captured 'freedom fighters' like prisoner-of-war and to allow visits by the ICRC - 
concessions are not made with regard to 'combatants' involved guerrilla warfare.92  The 
application of Common Article 3 to wars of national liberation is perhaps easier to 
accept, with wars of national liberation traditionally being regarded as non-international 
conflicts.  However, even though classification as a Common Article 3 conflict would 
merely afford the minimum of protection to those involved in a war of national liberation, 
this too has been only infrequently used as an option.  In fact, States have shown much 
reluctance in the application of Common Article 3 in any non-international conflict of 
any kind, not only with regard to wars of national liberation.  As with a state of 
insurgency or belligerency, Governments are not willing to admit that they have an armed 
conflict of any nature occurring within their territory, preferring to deal with it under their 
own municipal law, perhaps moderating the severity of the municipal law if the conflict 
is sustained over a period of time.  In fact, Higgins comments that Article 3 (1) is ignored 
in practice and that the second part of Article 3 (2) has never been practiced either, in any 
case of non-international conflict, much less in a war of national liberation.93  Therefore, 
while one might have hoped that the situation regarding adequate protection of 
individuals involved in wars of national liberation would have been ameliorated by the 
adoption of the Geneva Conventions, this wish has been only partly fulfilled.  However, 
the Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1949 and it was not until the period of 
decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s that the real debate regarding the application of 
international humanitarian law to wars of national liberation began.   
                                                          
91 See discussion of case law in Chapter 4. 
92 The issue of the status of 'combatants' involved in guerrilla warfare will be addressed in Chapter 4. 
93 See Higgins in Luard 1972, 182. 
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Chapter 3:  The Diplomatic Conference of 1974 - 1977 
Between 1949 and 1974 when the International Committee of the Red Cross convened 
the Diplomatic Conference for the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, evolution in international community 
ideas and, consequently in international law, had engendered a development in the 
recognition and classification of wars of national liberation as wars of an international 
character.  This evolution had at its core, the principle of self-determination.  While an in-
depth analysis of the concept of self-determination is beyond the scope of this 
discussion94, some discussion of this topic is necessary for a full understanding of the 
evolutionary process undergone by international humanitarian law as it relates to laws of 
national liberation.  To this end, part one of the discussion of this Chapter will focus on 
the principle of self-determination at a political and legal level prior to 1974, and part two 




Both Article 1 and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter95 refer to the principle of 
self-determination, a principle which has often been a source of controversy within the 
organization, with some member States regarding self-determination as 'a mere standard 
of achievement towards which member States should strive as an ideal',96 while others 
view it as a legal obligation. Over the years, however, the principle of self-determination 
has been the source of many General Assembly resolutions and has gradually taken on 
the mantle of the second option, i.e. that of a legal right.  
 
During the period of decolonisation, the international community gave much theoretical 
support to those involved in struggles for national liberation.  This support took the guise 
of multifarious resolutions adopted by the United Nations and other international and 
                                                          
94 For a comprehensive study of the principle of self-determination see generally Buchheit 1978, Grahl-
Madsen 1979, Pomerance 1982, Castellino 2000, and McCorquodale 2000.  See also Bassiouni 1971 and 
Clarke 1980.  
95 Charter of the United Nations (1945), as amended by GA Res. 1991(XVIII), 1963 (557 UNTS 143); 
2101, 1965(638 UNTS 308); and 2847 (XXVI) 1971 (892 UNTS 119) 
96 Abi-Saab in Akkerman, Van Krieken and Pannenborg 1977, 369. 
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regional organisations.  Many of these messages of support were founded on the UN 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.97  This 
declared that: 
 
1.The subjugation of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation 
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of 
the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and 
co-operation… 
 
4.All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against                
dependent peoples shall cease to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely 
their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory 
shall be respected. 
 
Another example of such support is a resolution adopted in 1964 by the Conference of 
Jurists of Afro-Asian Countries in Conakry, which states that: 
 
...all struggles undertaken by the peoples for the national independence or for 
the restitution of the territories or occupied parts thereof, including armed 
struggle, are entirely legal.98 
 
Resort to arms by colonised peoples was also recognised by the Conference of Non-
aligned States in 1964 in Cairo.  It was stated here that: 
 
...the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible.  Colonized peoples 
may legitimately resort to arms to secure the full exercise of  their right to self-
determination and independence if Colonial Powers persist in opposing their 
natural aspirations.99 
 
The idea that the attainment of liberation was irresistible was echoed in many UN 
resolutions issued by the General Assembly from 1965 onwards, which reaffirmed the 
legitimacy of the struggle for self-determination and thus for national liberation, e.g. GA 
Resolution 2105 (XX) of 1965.100  Self-determination was also classified as a 
fundamental right of all peoples in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
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100 See also, GA Res. 2107 (XX), GA Res. 2189 (XXI) of 1966, GA Res. 2326 (XXII) of 1967, GA Res. 
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Political Rights101 and the International Covenant on Social, Cultural and Economic 
Rights102 of 1966.  Following on in this trend in 1970 came the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.103  This Declaration is significant 
with regard to the world community's view on self-determination, and indeed on wars of 
national liberation, because its drafting Committee worked on the basis of consensus and 
it was also adopted by the General Assembly by consensus.  As Abi-Saab comments:  
'Thus, for the first time the western Powers as a whole recognized self-determination as a 
legal right and its denial as a violation of the Charter.'104 
 
The adoption of this Declaration illustrates that by 1970, the international community had 
recognised the principle of self-determination as a legal right.  This Declaration was 
important not only because of its most positive contribution to the debate on the status of 
self-determination but also because of its reference to the use of force regarding self-
determination and the legality thereof.  As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, up to this point 
in history, wars of national liberation - encompassing wars of those seeking self-
determination - had been regarded, and dealt with almost exclusively, as conflicts of a 
non-international nature, falling within the remit of municipal law and Common Article 3 
only.  Therefore, both the use of force by liberation movements to gain self-determination 
and by 'parent' governments to quell such armed activity was not subject to the 
prohibition of the use of force in international law.105  However, once self-determination 
was recognised as an international legal right, then the issue of the use of force in wars of 
national liberation was also altered.  Firstly, wars of national liberation could no longer 
be viewed as domestic conflicts.  The 1970 Declaration itself states: 
 
The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the 
Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State 
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administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall 
exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-governing Territory have 
exercised their right of self-determination… 
 
Regarding the use of force, the Declaration states: 
 
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives 
peoples…of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence.  In 
their action against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the 
exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and 
receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. 
 
Abi-Saab comments, regarding this provision, that: 
 
It clearly states that the 'forcible action' or force which is prohibited by Article 2, 
paragraph 4 of the Charter is not that used by peoples struggling for self-
determination but that which is resorted to by the colonial or alien governments 
to deny them self-determination.106 
 
This implies that force used by national liberation movements or third States to resist a 
denial of self-determination is, in fact, legitimate under the UN Charter.107  The 1970 
Declaration ultimately leads to the conclusion that the whole corpus of jus in bello should 
apply to wars of national liberation as they are conflicts of an international nature caused 
by a struggle for self-determination which has been denied by force.108  Abi-Saab states: 
 
The 1970 Declaration clearly reveals the legal conviction of the international 
community as a whole on the different components of the principle of self-
determination which make for the international status of wars of national 
liberation.  Legal conviction is one of two elements of international custom; the 
other is practice.  And much practice did take place mainly, but not exclusively, 
within international organizations.109 
 
Examples of this practice are to be found in the many General Assembly resolutions 
calling for the application of the Geneva Conventions to wars of national liberation, e.g. 
Resolution 3103 (XXVIII) in 1973.  This resolution contained the  'Basic principles on 
the legal status of the combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and 
racist regimes'.  Point 3 of the Declaration, which was adopted 83:13:19, stated: 
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The armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples against colonial and alien 
domination and racist regimes are to be regarded as international armed conflicts 
in the sense of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the legal status envisaged to 
apply to the combatants in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other international 
instruments is to apply to the persons engaged in armed struggle against colonial 
and alien domination and racist regimes. 
 
The General Assembly also adopted resolutions regarding specific instances of struggles 
for self-determination and national liberation, e.g. Resolution 2787 (XXVI) in 1971 
which mentions Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and the 
'Palestine people'.  Both the General Assembly and the Security Council have also 
recommended, and in once instance ordered, sanctions against colonial or alien 
governments and have also recommended for the provision of aid to national liberation 
movements.  Additionally, the UN has set up the Special Committee on the Situation with 
regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples which maintains links with many national liberation 
movements.  Observer status has also been granted to several national liberation 
movements in many of the UN's organs and specialised agencies as well as at many UN- 
sponsored Conferences.  Indeed, full observer status has been conferred upon the PLO 
and SWAPO by the General Assembly. 
 
Other regional organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) have also 
adopted resolutions similar to the UN resolutions regarding liberation movements and 
have also provided aid to these movements.  Indeed, many individual States have 
recognised liberation movements, some allowing the movements to establish official 









International Developments Prior to The Diplomatic Conference for the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflicts 1974 - 1977 
Two years prior to the 1970 Declaration regarding self-determination, the UN had shown 
its interest in International Humanitarian Law at the Teheran International Conference on 
Human Rights.  This Conference was concerned with respect for human rights in 
situations of armed conflict.  The ICRC also realised at this point that the law of armed 
conflicts was not adequately developed to deal with contemporary warfare.  They 
presented a report on the subject of the development of humanitarian law to the 21st 
International Red Cross Conference in Istanbul in 1969.   
 
Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law 1971 - 1972 
Building upon its earlier work, the ICRC convened a Conference of Government Experts 
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflicts in Geneva from 24 May to 12 June 1971.  This was a very important 
conference in that it was the first major conference in recent times with the aim of 
updating the law relating to armed conflicts.  Governments elected experts to attend the 
conference but the delegates did not necessarily act as representatives of their 
governments.  Both the United Nations and the Swiss Federal Council were represented 
along with 39 other delegations - 16 from WEORG, 6 from Eastern Europe, 10 from 
Asia/Africa, 4 from the Middle East and 3 from Latin America.  In order to update and 
develop international humanitarian law to more adequately address contemporary 
conflicts, the Conference decided to reaffirm and supplement the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 rather than revise them, as they did not want to be seen to be weakening these 
Conventions and thus, humanitarian law protection. 
 
As a means of supplementing the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC proposed that they 
would formulate an Additional Protocol on Guerrilla Warfare,110 composed of five main 
principles.  The first concerned the status of combatants and prisoners-of-war following 
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on from Article 4 A(2) of the prisoner-of-war Convention.  The second principle dealt 
with the controversial issue of international versus non-international conflicts.  Here the 
Conference proposed the drafting of standard minimum rules which would apply to all 
armed conflicts but which would have no bearing on the categorisation of the conflict as 
international or non-international or on the legal status of the parties to the conflict.  The 
rules would be the subject of undertakings by both belligerent parties which would then 
be made known to the ICRC who would in turn notify the 'enemy' party in the conflict 
and also the other signatories of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.111  The third principle 
concerned the civilian population and the protection thereof, which emphasised the idea 
of distinction.  The methods and means of warfare were dealt with as the fourth principle, 
with the recognition that the right to inflict injury on the enemy is not unlimited, and the 
reaffirmation of the principles of the 4th Hague Convention. The issue of implementation 
was the fifth main principle to be dealt with, with the ICRC being allowed to offer certain 
support to victims. Both parties to the conflict were to allow international observers to 
verify alleged violations of the rules by a means that was yet to be formulated. 
 
However, these proposals proved to be too radical for the Conference of Experts who 
were not willing to allow for a separate Protocol on guerrilla warfare, even though both 
the ICRC and the Conference of Experts believed that guerrilla warfare was not a 
category but a form of conflict which could be either international or non-international.112  
The Conference of experts did not agree however, that there was a need to treat guerrilla 
warfare in such a specialised manner as to devote a specific protocol to it and believed 
that the issue of guerrilla warfare would be better dealt with in the context of other forms 
of armed conflict.  They also believed that a distinction should be kept between 
international and non-international armed conflicts. At the Conference of Experts, the 
Norwegian delegation had proposed that only one uniform Additional Protocol be 
adopted which would be applicable to conflicts of either an international or a non-
international character.  It was believed that one protocol was the logical approach from 
the point of view of the victims who suffer equally in international and non-international 
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conflicts.  The Norwegian delegation was of the opinion that a distinction in the 
protection afforded to victims of international and non-international conflicts would 
result in 'selective humanitarianism'.113  However, as Schlindler points out: 
 
...such a uniform Protocol would not correspond to the current structure of the 
world community.  International law has to take into account that the world is 
divided into sovereign States, and that these States keep to their sovereignty.  
They are not willing to put insurgents within their territory on equal terms with 
the armed forces of enemy States, or members thereof...Besides, one has to bear 
in mind that a uniform protocol would inevitably reduce the level of 
humanitarian law for international conflicts to that of non-international 
conflicts.114 
 
This session of the Conference of Experts did not manage to agree on much else besides 
the unacceptability of the ICRC's proposals.  The ICRC then had to set about drafting two 
draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to be ready for discussion 
at the next meeting of the Conference of Experts in 1972.  Approximately 400 experts 
were present at this conference on behalf of 77 governments.115  The first draft Protocol 
concerned international armed conflicts and dealt with aspects of both Geneva and Hague 
law.  The second draft Protocol developed and supplemented Article 3 common to the 
four Geneva Conventions regarding non-international conflicts discussed previously.  
Following on from this and from the contemporaneous political discussion of self-
determination, the ICRC also formulated a draft Declaration on the Application of 
International Humanitarian Law in Armed Struggles for Self-Determination.  This 
Declaration did not serve to please anyone however.  Firstly, the Declaration sought to 
have the Conference declare that the Geneva Conventions, Protocol I and other rules of 
armed conflicts should be applied in situations of wars of national liberation.  If that was 
not the case then both Article 3 and Protocol II should be applied or else both parties 
should apply rules, which the ICRC had yet to formulate, but would accompany the 
Declaration.  As Suter points out: 
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Some experts disapproved of the whole principle of giving any movements 
special status; others thought that not enough legal protection was given.  The 
stage was set for the collision at Geneva in 1974. 116 
 
Diplomatic Conference for the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 1974 - 1977 
The first session of the Diplomatic Conference for the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts took place from 29 
February to 29 March 1974.  One would expect that with the various UN resolutions and 
the universal acceptance of self-determination as a legal principle in the years just prior to 
the Conference that the issue of wars of national liberation and their status as 
international conflicts would have been an important aspect of the draft Protocols.  
However, these Protocols 'practically ignored the issue'.117  This was very unsatisfactory 
in the eyes of many delegations and needed to be remedied.  This lack in the draft 
Protocols coupled with diametrically opposing ideas regarding the application of 
international humanitarian law to non-international conflicts as well as the status of wars 
of national liberation manifested itself in a show of bitter disagreement and 
unpleasantness at the Conference.118  As Suter comments:  'The session was one of the 
most bitter conferences which many of the people had ever attended, all the more so 
because no one had foreseen this.'119 
 
Before the Conference began it was expected that the work of the Conference would not 
be too difficult because the two draft Additional Protocols had been formulated and 
debated by both medical and legal experts already.  All that was left to be accomplished 
by the Conference was to gain final political approval from the 126 governments 
represented at the 1974 session.   The first major issues to be faced by the Conference 
were not in fact the substantive issues of the Protocols themselves however, but 
procedural problems.  Among these issues was whether or not to invite national liberation 
movements recognised by either the OAU or the League of Arab States to the 
Conference.  It was eventually decided that the liberation movements would be invited 
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but they would have no voting power.120  These liberation movements were: the African 
National Congress (South Africa) (ANC), the African National Council of Zimbabwe 
(ANCZ), the Angola National Liberation Front (FNLA), the Mozambique Liberation 
Front (FRELIMO), the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), Panafricanist Congress 
(South Africa) (PAC), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the 
Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP), the South West Africa People's Organisation 
(SWAPO), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African 
People's Union (ZAPU). 
 
Once the problem of invitations had been addressed and the liberation movements had 
been invited, the draft Additional Protocols then came up for consideration.  However, 
the issue of liberation movements once again came to the fore of the debate.  The 
problem was the status of wars of national liberation - were they to be regarded as 
international conflicts and thus come within the scope of Protocol I or were they to be 
treated as non-international and be dealt with by Protocol II?  The issue of national 
liberation movements was given to Commission I to be discussed. 
 
The scope of the ICRC's draft Protocol I was addressed in Article 1.  This Article stated: 
 
The present Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, for the Protection of War Victims, shall apply in the situations referred to 
in Article 2 common to the conventions. 
 
These situations referred to in Common Article 2 are: 
 
...all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the high contracting parties, even if the state of war is 
not recognized by one of them. 
 
Obviously, the avoidance of the issue of wars of national liberation was unsatisfactory to 
many delegations.  Wars of national liberation had been conferred with the status of an 
international conflict by the world community through various UN and other resolutions.  
Here, however, the ICRC had completely ignored these political developments and had 
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taken the traditional international law approach of treating wars of national liberation as 
falling outside the scope of the law relating to international conflicts.  To try to rectify 
this 'injustice' the Third World governments / governments of the Least Developed 
countries proposed an addition to the above-quoted draft paragraph: 
 
...the situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in 
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
As was expected, an amendment of this sort was not agreeable to Western States, 
especially ex-Colonial States, and various objections were made to it.  Firstly, it was 
submitted that there was not a customary rule of international law that conferred 
international status on wars of national liberation.  However, as discussed above, the 
international community had already recognised the international character of wars of 
national liberation with the adoption of the 1970 UN Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.121  With regard to practice, the 
various resolutions adopted by the UN and other regional organisations with regard to the 
application of the laws of war to wars of national liberation are proof of this.  Some 
objections were made which claimed that the amendment was based on purely political 
and subjective criteria.  Also at issue was the fear that the amendment resurrected the 
problems of the 'just war'122 doctrine and introduced an element of discrimination into 
humanitarian law.   
 
Alternatives to the amendment were proposed, e.g. CDDH / I / 12 by the UK, Belgium, 
Federal Republic of Germany, The Netherlands, Argentina and Pakistan which purported 
to add two paragraphs to draft Article 1 - one reiterating Common Article 1 of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
120 Conference Resolution 3(1) adopting draft resolution CDDH / 22. 
121 GA Res. 2625 (XXV). 
122 For an in-depth discussion of the 'just war' concept see generally Graham 1975, Grahl-Madsen 1979, 
Johnson 1981 and Verwey 1977. 
 39
Geneva Conventions and one which restated the Martens clause which was to encompass 
situations of wars of national liberation.  This clause stated: 
 
In cases not included in this present Protocol or in other instruments of 
conventional law, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and the 
authority of the principles of international law, as they result from established 
custom, from the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.123 
 
However, it was believed that the Martens clause did not solve the dilemma of wars of 
national liberation because  
 
...it simply reserves the application of pre-existing customary law and principles 
of humanity to victims of armed conflict falling outside the scope of the 
conventional instrument.124 
 
A different solution was put forward by the Canadian delegate who proposed the idea that 
the need to apply the Protocol to any given situation should be the subject of a 
resolution.125  However, this idea too, was rejected.  This rejection was followed by more 
discussion, more uncertainty and more disagreement.126  Eventually, the commission was 
forced to convene a vote on the proposed amendment to Article 1 of the draft Protocol.  
The delegates voted 70 to 21 in favour of the amendment with 13 abstentions.  Suter says 
of the dispute and debate surrounding Article 1 of the Draft Protocol at the Conference in 
1974: 
I believe that the essence of the Article 1 dispute was not, as is so often the case 
nowadays at conferences concerned with the progressive development of 
international law, a matter of wanting to change the law for the sake of changing 
it.  Instead, certain governments wished to use the conference as a political tool 
with which to provide some assistance to the national liberation movements.127 
 
As will be discussed in depth in Chapter 4, in addition to the classification of wars of 
national liberation as international conflicts, the Least Developed countries also 
succeeded at the Diplomatic Conference in attaining the status of combatants for 
'freedom fighters', fighting a guerrilla-style war, who would be treated as prisoners-of-
war if captured.  Article 44 sets out new rules regarding combatant status that is broad 
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enough to include 'freedom' or resistance fighters.128  Also included in Protocol I is 
Article 96 (3); a means by which national liberation movements could accede to the 
Protocol.  Those involved in fighting wars of national liberation seemed to have gained a 
very important victory at the Diplomatic Conference of 1974 - 77.  Prima facie, they had 
gained recognition of wars of national liberation as international conflicts, a method by 
which these wars could benefit from international humanitarian law long denied to these 
conflicts, and special consideration embodied in the Protocol for the unique type of 
warfare conducted by national liberation movements.  To all intents and purposes, the 
result of the Diplomatic Conference was very positive for national liberation movements 
and for those involved in wars of national liberation.  It could be said, in fact, that a 
victory of this magnitude with such political and legal implications was even more than 
national liberation movements or Third World Countries had hoped for.  Suter, in fact, 
comments that he believes it was not the intention of the delegations from the Least 
Developed countries who proposed the amendment or of the Eastern European countries 
who supported it to actually alter the status of national liberation movements in 
international law.129  He offers three reasons to support his theory.   
 
Firstly, he points out that any government that was engaged in a conflict with a national 
liberation movement would be unwilling, logically enough, to ratify Protocol 1 in its 
amended form.  Indeed, South Africa, Portugal and Israel were clear on this point in 
1974.  Therefore, the change in status of wars of national liberation would have been of 
no practical use to them.  The second reason given by Suter is that although the 
Governments of the Least Developed countries could not have foreseen the bitterness of 
the dispute of the Conference of 1974, they already knew that the Western Governments 
would not be in favour of such an amendment and could possibly be willing to see the 
collapse of the whole Conference rather than see amended Article 1 be adopted.  The 
third reason Suter gives for this theory is that by the time the draft Protocols were 
adopted, most of the wars of national liberation would have been resolved.  Again, the 
amended Protocol would be of no practical use.   
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Why then, Suter asks, push the amendment?  There are many reasons why the 
amendment was of great importance to its proposers.  Firstly, the amended Protocol gave 
increased recognition and status to national liberation movements and their wars at 
international level.  Also, the Least Developed countries had to be seen to be acting on 
their beliefs.  For years before the Conference they had criticised colonialism and 
apartheid and now they had a chance to bring about a political and legal manifestation of 
this criticism.  Another reason was that the Least Developed countries were quite wary of 
Protocol II and wanted their issues of national liberation dealt with in Protocol I.  The 
Third World countries had wanted recognition of the uniqueness of their particular 
category of wars of national liberation and further, recognition of wars of national 
liberation as wars of an international character and therefore, these countries wanted no 
connection between Protocol II and wars of national liberation. 
 
At the end of the first session of the Conference, there was still no compromise regarding 
Article 1 of the Draft Protocol.  Informal meetings convened under the auspices of NGOs 
after the Conference discussed and tried to formulate a remedy for the problem of Article 
1.  It was again discussed at a meeting of experts in December 1974 entitled 'The Concept 
of International Armed Conflict:  Further Outlook',130 but to no avail. 
 
The second session of the Diplomatic Conference took place from 3 February to 18 April 
1975 in Geneva, to which the national liberation movements recognised by the OAU and 
the League of Arab Nations were once again invited.  While this session was much more 
productive than the first with a lot more constructive work taking place, not enough 
progress was made and it was decided to convene a third session of the Conference in 
1976 and a fourth and final session in 1977, during which the Protocols as amended, were 
adopted.  Thus, national liberation movements had gained an important victory in 
international political and legal terms by finally gaining recognition under international 
humanitarian law of wars of national liberation as international conflicts. 
 
                                                          




The absence of a reference to wars of national liberation in the ICRC draft Protocols was 
very odd in light of all the political discussion regarding this type of conflict in the UN 
and contemporary international law which directly preceded the Diplomatic Conference.  
It was therefore quite incongruous that the Diplomatic Conference sought to develop 
international humanitarian law without any reference to one of the most prevalent types 
of armed conflicts of the time.  As Greenwood comments:  
 
With hindsight, it was probably naive of the ICRC and the Swiss Government 
not to anticipate this 'hijacking' of their agenda, one result of which was that the 
Conference lasted four years instead of the one which had been envisaged.131 
 
It was also necessary to clarify the status of wars of national liberation and where they 
fitted into the new regime of international humanitarian law - under Protocol I as 
international conflicts as had been recognised in the 1970 Declaration of the UN132 by the 
international community or under Protocol II as non-international conflicts as 
traditionally viewed by international law.  The amendment to Article 1 of Protocol I can 
therefore be seen as an attempt to avoid future confusion and controversy regarding wars 
of national liberation by explicitly stating within the context of international humanitarian 
law what was already accepted by the international community, i.e. that wars of national 
liberation were conflicts of an international character.  While the victory won by national 
liberation movements and by Third World countries by way of amended Article 1 along 
with Articles 44 and 96, is to be welcomed, a proper assessment of these provisions is not 
possible without seeing how this political victory was put into legal practice, i.e. how do 
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Additional Protocol I and Wars of National Liberation 
The representatives of the national liberation movements that had attended the 1974-1977 
Diplomatic Conference had attained a very important political victory.  Article 1 (4), by 
which certain types of wars of national liberation were given status as international 
conflicts, was recognition by the international community (by those States that would 
consequently accede to the Protocol at least) of the legitimacy of struggles for self-
determination in the context of international humanitarian law.  The armed struggle for 
self-determination, for freedom from colonial domination, from alien occupation and 
from racist regimes, which had been developing in political legitimacy over the years 
through the adoption of various resolutions by the United Nations and by other regional 
organisations, was finally legally recognised as a conflict of an international nature.  It 
was a victory in political terms for the oppressed over the oppressors.  While recognition 
of legitimacy of one's case is important, more important are the practical legal 
implications of this recognition.  One would expect that recognition as international 
conflicts would be of great benefit to those fighting in, and affected by, wars of national 
liberation, with conflicts of an international character triggering the application of the 
whole corpus of jus in bello.  One would expect that this was exactly what national 
liberation movements had hoped for all through the time their 'cause' and their wars had 
been ignored by both traditional international law and indeed, to a large extent, by the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949.  One would expect that Protocol I of 1977 would forever 
alter the course of wars of national liberation for the better.  This, however, was not to be 
the case as expectations often fall short of reality.  The reality is that Protocol I has not 
served wars of national liberation well.  To fully understand the unfortunate lack of 
application of Protocol I to wars of national liberation and the benefits denied to national 
liberation movements thereby, a full understanding of the scope of the Protocol, and the 
means whereby a national liberation movement can agree to apply and be bound by it, 
must be attained.  To this end, the first section of this chapter will focus on Article 1 (the 
scope of the Protocol) and Article 96 (accession to the Protocol).  The second section will 
focus on the special provisions of Protocol I regarding combatants - Article 44 - and how 





Provisions relevant to Wars of National Liberation 
The Preamble of Protocol I begins with fine words expressing equally fine sentiments 
regarding the High Contracting Parties' wish for peace: 
 
The High Contracting Parties, Proclaiming their earnest wish to see peace 
prevail among peoples, 
Recalling that every State has the duty, in conformity with the Charter of the 
United Nations, to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations. 
Believing it necessary nevertheless to reaffirm and develop the provisions 
protecting the victims of armed conflicts and to supplement measures intended 
to reinforce their application. 
Expressing their conviction that nothing in this Protocol or in the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 can be construed as legitimizing or authorizing 
any act of aggression or any other use of force inconsistent with the Charter of 
the United Nations... 
 
References to the United Nations Charter and to the use of force inconsistent therewith in 
the Preamble is significant in light of the various Resolutions from the UN prior to the 
Diplomatic Conference of 1974 - 77 which recognised and reaffirmed the right to self-
determination for all those peoples under colonial domination, alien occupation and racist 
regimes and also recognised the illegality of the use of force by these oppressors. 
 
Scope 
However, it is Article 1 that is of the greatest importance to the present discussion.  As 
already outlined in Chapter 3, this is the provision 'hijacked' by the national liberation 
movements at the Geneva Diplomatic Conference.  Entitled 'General Principles and 
Scope of Application', this article states: 
 
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for 
this Protocol in all circumstances. 
2. In cases not covered by this Protocol or by the other international agreements, 
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the 
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. 
3. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in 
Article 2 common to those Conventions. (i.e. all cases of declared war or of any 
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other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them  
and all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting 
Party even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance) 
4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts 
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Obviously, the provision that concerns most us here is Article 1 (4) regarding wars of 
national liberation.  A very important aspect of Article 1 (4) is its restrictive scope.133  In 
order for Protocol I to apply to a conflict, the conflict must be an armed conflict in which 
a people is struggling against colonial domination, alien occupation or a racist regime and 
the struggle of that people must be in order to exercise its right to self-determination 
against a Contracting Party to the Protocol.   An analysis of the drafting history illustrates 
that it was the intention of the framers to strictly limit the application of the provision to 
only the three categories of wars of national liberation mentioned in the provision, i.e. a) 
colonial domination, b) alien occupation and c) racist regimes when the 'peoples' 
oppressed by these regimes are fighting for self-determination.  Another proposal put 
forward by some developing countries and Australia and Norway, which would have left 
room for the extension of the category of wars of national liberation, was rejected134.  As 
Cassese comments:  'In short, at least the majority of the framers of Article 1 paragraph 4 
manifestly intended to 'issue a legal command' having a well-defined and very narrow 
field of application.'135 
 
However, there was some confusion at the Diplomatic Conference regarding the scope of 
application of this provision.  The confusion and uncertainty emanates from the word 
'include' in paragraph 4.  The use of this word could imply that the list is not exhaustive.  
This view was, in fact, taken by one delegation at the conference - a very important 
declaration was made by an Australian delegate at the adoption of the Article at the 
plenary session of the Conference in 1977.  He said that Australia took the view that the 
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three categories of wars mentioned in Article 1 (4) were not exhaustive and that other 
categories of wars of national liberation contemplated by the principle of self-
determination by many UN instruments could also be covered by this article.136  This 
declaration has been the subject of much academic discussion137 and might eventually 
lead to an extension of Article 1 (4).  However, another delegation at the Conference 
believed that Article 1 (4) was too restrictive, as it restricted the application of the 
Protocol to only the three types of situation listed in Article 1 (4).138  If one analyses the 
UN Charter and the Declaration on Friendly Relations, it is clear that the right to self-
determination is granted to all peoples equally and in every respect - it is not limited to 
the situations enumerated in Article 1 (4).  The ICRC Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols states with regard to the meaning of the word 'include':  'We consider that it 
should be interpreted as introducing an exhaustive list of cases which are considered to 
form part of the situations covered by the preceding paragraph.'139 
 
The Commentary goes on to state: 
 
In our opinion, it must be concluded that the list is exhaustive and complete:  it 
certainly covers all cases in which a people, in order to exercise its right of self-
determination, must resort to the use of armed force against the interference of 
another people, or against a racist regime.140 
 
For the moment therefore, the scope of Article 1 (4) remains restrictive.  This has been 
one of the major criticisms of the Protocol by academics, e.g. Greenwood comments that: 
 
...it is important to appreciate the narrow scope of Article 1(4).  Despite its 
emotive language, this provision does not apply to every group which calls itself 
a 'national liberation movement' or claims to be fighting for self-determination.  
In the first place, it should be noted that Article 1 (4) applies only in an 'armed 
conflict'.  Although that term is nowhere defined, it implies a certain level of 
intensity going beyond isolated acts of violence.  Thus the Red Brigades, Action 
Directe, the Baader-Meinhof Gang and groups of that kind fall wholly outside 
the scope of the provision on this ground alone...141 
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Therefore, while national liberation movements would have sincerely welcomed the 
adoption of the amended Article 1 at the Diplomatic Conference, its restrictive provisions 
mean that only some of these movements could benefit from it.  Only very few wars of 
national liberation would fall within the scope of application of the Protocol, leaving 
some national liberation movements and some civilians involved in wars of national 
liberation without adequate international humanitarian law protection.  While the fact that 
some wars of national liberation would be covered by Protocol I is to be welcomed, one 
cannot but question why a wider scope of application was not seen to be viable.  As 
Cassese comments: 
 
...from a strictly humanitarian standpoint, extending the applicability of 
Protocol I to a larger category of armed conflicts could not but appear positive.  
Such an extension would involve the application of a greater number of 
humanitarian rules to these conflicts, and hence would mean greater safeguard 
of human life.  Of course, this also means that combatants are not longer 
considered common law criminals but lawful combatants, and are exempt from 
punishment for the mere fact of fighting against the central government.  But is 
this really so bad?  Is not what counts the fact that all those who participate in 
armed conflicts behave in conformity with international law, without 
committing war crimes or crimes against humanity?  By considering wars of 
national liberation, other than those falling under Article 1, para. 4, as simple 
internal conflicts one merely places fewer restrictions on violence and thus 
attenuates to a much lesser extent the bitterness and cruelty of armed conflict.  It 
may seem difficult for a State to treat insurgents fighting for self-determination 
as lawful combatants rather than as criminals; but it must be borne in mind that 
the counterpart to such treatment is greater protection for the civilian population, 
a much more extensive restriction on the methods and means of warfare and 
thus much greater humanitarian protection for all those embroiled in the armed 
conflict.142 
 
Another major criticism which can be made of Article 1 (4) is that it is quite dated.  The 
drafters of the provision didn't take the political reality of their time into account because 
it limits the application of the Protocol to the three categories of conflict enumerated in 
Article 1 (4), three categories of conflict that rapidly declined in frequency soon after 
1977.  When this provision was drafted, much attention was focused on Portugal's 
African colonies and their struggle for self-determination.  However, as Greenwood 
comments:  'Since the emergence of these colonies as independent States, the practical 
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importance of this part of Article 1 (4) is virtually non-existent.'143  Other types of wars of 
national liberation fought for self-determination against other types of regimes, e.g. 
authoritarian regimes, are not covered at all by the Protocol.   
 
Also, another criticism of this provision is that any State who has a regime which could 
be considered to fall within the scope of Article 1 (4), e.g. South Africa, would be very 
unlikely to accede to Protocol I.144  A national liberation movement in such a State would 
therefore, find it difficult to accede to the Protocol, and to demand application of the 
Protocol to its conflict with the State authorities.145 
 
Accession 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is some doubt regarding the possibility of application of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to wars of national liberation because national liberation 
movements are not States.  The important provisions regarding wars of national liberation 
contained in Article 1 (4) of Protocol I would be of no use if this were the case regarding 
the application of the Protocol.  Therefore, Article 96 of Protocol I, i.e. 'Treaty relations 
upon entry into force of this Protocol', provides that national liberation movements may 
agree to apply and be bound by the Conventions and the Protocol.  This Article states: 
 
1. When the Parties to the Conventions are also Parties to this Protocol, the 
Conventions shall apply as supplemented by this Protocol. 
2. When one of the Parties to the conflict is not bound by this Protocol, the 
Parties to the Protocol shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations.  They 
shall furthermore be bound by this Protocol in relation to each of the Parties 
which are not bound by it, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof. 
3. The authority representing a people engaged against a High Contracting Party 
in an armed conflict of the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, may 
undertake to apply the Conventions and this protocol in relation to that conflict 
by means of a unilateral declaration addressed to the depositary. Such 
declaration shall, upon receipt by the depositary, have in relation to that conflict 
the following effects: 
(a) The Conventions and this protocol are brought into force for the said 
authority as a Party to the conflict with immediate effect; 
(b) The said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those which 
have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and this 
Protocol; and 
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(c) The Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding upon all Parties to the 
conflict.  
 
Both paragraph 1 and 2 of this Article correspond with Article 84 of the draft Protocol 
that was submitted to the Diplomatic Conference.  Paragraph 3 regarding wars of national 
liberation however, was formulated and proposed at the Conference itself after the 
adoption of Article 1 paragraph 4 by Committee I, as it was obvious at this stage that if 
wars of national liberation were now legally international, then a special procedure of 
acceptance was necessary for national liberation movements, i.e. authorities representing 
peoples seeking self-determination in an armed conflict against colonial domination, 
alien occupation and racist regimes. 
 
In order for an authority to accept to apply and be bound by the Protocol under this 
provision, certain criteria must be met.  Firstly, the prerequisites of Article 1 (4) of 
Protocol I must be satisfied, i.e. there must be an armed conflict where a people are 
fighting for self-determination against colonial domination, alien occupation and racist 
regimes.  This armed conflict must be between such a people and a Party to Protocol I.  
This people / authority must then make a Declaration to the Depositary who will in turn 
notify the other Parties to the Geneva Conventions.146  The issue of 'authority' is not 
without some uncertainty however.  Under Protocol I, while the regimes against which 
wars of national liberation are fought are defined, there is much ambiguity concerning the 
national liberation movements themselves.  Because of the looseness of Article 1 (4), any 
group that engages in armed conflict against any of the three categories of regimes 
mentioned in Article 1 (4) could be seen to be a national liberation movement and thus 
fall within the field of application of the Protocol.  This could mean that in some 
situations of conflicts for self-determination there may be more than one authority 
claiming to represent the people struggling for self-determination. The ICRC 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols states: 
 
In such a case the present paragraph may be applied without difficulty if there is 
a common declaration or if there are concordant declarations form those 
authorities; if, on the other hand, one or other of the authorities does not make 
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the declaration, this paragraph applies only between the Contracting Party an the 
authority or authorities making the declaration.147 
 
If a Declaration is made by a competent authority to the depositary this brings into force 
rights and duties between the national liberation movement and the State involved in the 
conflict because the State had already become a Party to the Protocol.  The Authority 
then assumes equal rights and obligations with the Contracting Party.148 
 
No Declaration has ever been made under Article 96 (3) however.149  The IRA's150 
intention at the Diplomatic Conference of 1974 - 77 to make a declaration under this 
provision has been noted.151  Also, on the 28 Of November 1980, Oliver Tambo 
announced to the ICRC on behalf of the ANC that this liberation movement would both 
accept and apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977.  SWAPO did 
similarly on 25 August 1981 regarding its intention to accept and apply the Geneva 
Conventions152.  The ANC made a Declaration to the ICRC on 3 December 1980, which 
stated that the ANC intended to respect the 'general principles of humanitarian law 
applicable in armed conflicts'.153  This Declaration had been annexed to a letter from the 
Chairman of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid to the Secretary-General.154  
No specific reference was made to article 96 or indeed to Article 1 (4) but the declaration 
stated that: 
 
Wherever practically possible, the African National Congress of South Africa 
will endeavour to respect the rules of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for 
the victims of armed conflicts and the 1977 Additional protocol I relating to the 
protection of victims of international armed conflicts.  
 
Regarding Article 96 (3) Aldrich comments: 
 
As a result of this provision, in the absence of such a declaration, the 
Conventions and Protocol have by their terms no application to wars of national 
                                                          
147 Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmerman 1987, 1089. 
148 Article 7 (Meetings) and all of Part VI except Article 96 of protocol are not applicable to the authority. 
149 See Wolf 1984, 40. 
150 Irish Republican Army. 
151 See Green 1989, 150 and Greenwood 1989, 197, footnote 31. 
152 See von Tangen Page 1998, 38. 
153 See Aldrich 1991, 7, footnote 18. 
154 UN Doc. A / 35 / 710 (1980). 
 51
liberation.  Members of the armed forces of a national liberation movement do 
not therefore enjoy the protections of those treaties unless the movement 
formally accepts all the obligations of the Conventions and the Protocol in the 
same way as the state parties.  Few, if any, liberation movements could expect to 
be in a position to carry out such obligations unless they are about to succeed in 
becoming the government of the state.  In any event, members of the armed 
forces of liberation movements are not granted protections simply because they 
may be deemed to be fighting for a just cause;  the Protocol and the Conventions 
must apply equally to both sides if they are to apply to the conflict at all.155 
 
Aldrich also goes on to point out that: '...in the absence of such a declaration, no 
colorable claim can be made to prisoner-of-war status or other benefits under the 
Protocol.'156 
 
Combatant and Prisoner-of-War status 
Along with accession, there was also another issue to be dealt with at the Diplomatic 
Conference before Protocol I could be seen to be of any practical use in wars of national 
liberation, i.e. combatant and prisoner-of-war status.  Article 1 of the Regulations 
annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV lay down certain criteria that must be met for 
a combatant to be deemed a lawful combatant who is afforded a special status under 
international humanitarian law.  Article 1 of these Regulations States: 
 
The laws, rights, and duties of wars apply not only to armies, but also to militia 
and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
 
  1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
  2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
  3. To carry arms openly; and  
4. To conduct their operation in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
 
The 1949 Geneva Convention I, II and II reiterate these criteria and also make express 
reference to the application of these criteria to members of resistance movements.157  
However, by their very nature, guerrilla movements would find it extremely difficult to 
fulfil these criteria, especially number 2.  Even in 1949 these criteria were seen by many 
as being unrealistic with regard to contemporary warfare.  The ICRC Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols states: 
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It is actually rather strange to note that ...the law of The Hague coped rather well 
during 1939 - 45, so as to survive virtually intact, even at the end of the 
Diplomatic Conference of 1949.  Hundreds of thousands, if not millions of 
resistance fighters opposed the occupying armies in Europe and elsewhere, often 
with nothing more than makeshift equipment at their disposal, but the Hague 
Regulations were not, on the whole, seriously shaken thereby.158 
 
The issue of guerrilla fighters was discussed at the Human Rights Conference in Teheran 
in 1968.  Also discussed were UN General Assembly Resolutions on this issue, e.g. Res. 
2852 (XXVI) of 1971 and Res. 3032 (XXVII) of 1972.  Before the start of the Diplomatic 
Conference in 1974, some discussion had been focused on this issue with suggestions 
being made that the open carrying of arms during military operations could be sufficient 
to distinguish guerrilla fighters from civilians.159  However, the ICRC's Draft Protocol I 
only provided for a duty on members of organised resistance movements to 'distinguish' 
themselves without any further elaboration or explanation in its Article 42.  When the 
issue of distinction was coupled with the potential internationalisation of wars of national 
liberation at the first session of the Diplomatic Conference in 1974 however, various 
objections were voiced. Some delegations claimed that such a concession to guerrilla 
fighters... 
 
...amounted to abolishing the requirement that the law of armed conflict be 
respected in military operations conducted by members of guerrilla movements, 
while still granting the latter the status of legitimate combatants and of prisoner 
of war in case of capture160. 
 
Article 43 of Protocol I defines 'armed forces':  
 
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed 
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party 
for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a 
government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party.  Such armed 
forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall 
enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict. 
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical 
personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are 
combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities. 
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3. Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law of 
enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to 
the conflict. 
 
Article 44 then modifies the above-quoted requirements of the Hague IV Regulations of 
1979.  This Article states: 
 
1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the power of an 
adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war. 
2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, violations of these rules shall not deprive a 
combatant of his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the power of an 
adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war, except as provided in 
paragraphs 3 and 4. 
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects 
of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation 
preparatory to an attack.  Recognizing, however, that there are situations in 
armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant 
cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided 
that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly: 
(a) During each military engagement, and 
(b) During such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a 
military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to 
participate.  Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall 
not be considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1 
(c). 
4.  A combatant who falls into the power if an adverse Party while failing to 
meet the requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall 
forfeit his right to be a prisoner if war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given 
protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war by the 
Third Convention and by this Protocol.  This protection includes protections 
equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention in the 
case where such a person is tried and punished for any offences he has 
committed. 
5. Any combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while not 
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack shall not 
forfeit his rights to be a combatant and a prisoner of war by virtue of his prior 
activities. 
6. This Article is without prejudice to the right of any person to be a prisoner of 
war pursuant to Article 4 of the Third Convention. 
7. This Article is not intended to change the generally accepted practice of States 
with respect to the wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the 
regular, uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict. 
8. In addition to the categories of persons mentioned in Article 13 of the First 
and Second Conventions, all members if the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict, as defined in Article 43 of this Protocol, shall be entitled to protection 
under those Conventions if they are wounded or sick or, in the case of the 
Second Convention, shipwrecked at sea or in other waters. 
 
Therefore, the requirements to be met by a 'freedom fighter' in a war of national 
liberation for him to be deemed to be a combatant and to enable him to benefit from 
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prisoner-of-war status if apprehended, are now much more relaxed.  The second sentence 
of Article 44 (3), a compromise that was proposed by the United States and the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, has been the focus of much attention.  The General rule 
is set out in the first sentence of this provision and is quite strict, and the second sentence 
is not always applicable.  Regarding Article 44 (3) Greenwood comments: 
 
The first sentence differs from the previous law in two respects.  First, it does 
not specify the manner in which combatants must distinguish themselves from 
civilians; there is no reference to a fixed, distinctive sign.  Secondly, whereas the 
old law did not make clear when irregulars had to wear their fixed, distinctive 
sign or carry arms openly, Article 44 (3) specifies that the duty to distinguish 
oneself from the civilian population applies during 'an attack or...a military 
operation preparatory to an attack'.  This provision should be read together with 
Article 37 (1) (c), which provides that the war crime of perfidy is committed by 
'the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status.'161 
 
The second sentence allows for exceptions and for more relaxed requirements.  An 
important component of the second sentence is the term 'cannot distinguish'.  As 
Greenwood comments: 
 
In deciding...whether a person who has failed to distinguish himself from the 
civilian population in the way required by the first sentence of Article 44 (3) but 
has carried arms openly in the manner specified by the second sentence is 
entitled to combatant status, it must first be asked whether the nature of the 
hostilities are such as to bring the second sentence into operation.162 
 
Greenwood then goes on to comment on the general understanding of this provision: 
 
The views expressed by most delegations, and contained in declarations made 
on signature by the United Kingdom and the United States, that a combatant 
must carry arms openly throughout the time when he is visible to the enemy 
while moving to a place from which an attack is to be launched, clearly accords 
with the text and significantly limits the effects of the exceptional rule.163 
 
Conclusion 
Protocol I has been the source of much controversy.  The provisions of Article 1 (4) and 
Article 96 (3) were seen in some quarters as introducing 'the highly politicised 
considerations of ius ad bellum'164 into international humanitarian law and were thus 
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heavily criticised.  The Protocol was even christened a 'law in the service of terror'.165  
However, this present analysis has shown that Protocol I, including Articles 1 (4) and 96 
(3), is not to be feared.  As Greenwood comments: '...if one examines the practical 
aspects of these provisions, they turn out to be very limited.'166  In a similar vein, 
Schlindler comments: '...these provisions have small chances ever to be applied.'167 
 
It is obvious that the scope of Article 1 (4) is very restrictive, applying as it does to only 
three categories of struggles for self-determination.  The provision is a product of its time 
and an illustration of the fact that international humanitarian law is ultimately backward 
looking - a reaction to past events and conflicts, rather than proactive in nature.168  A 
clear example of this is the element of self-determination regarding colonial domination, 
a phenomenon which rapidly declined soon after the adoption of the Protocol.   
 
It has been pointed out that perhaps Article 1 (4) may come to be given a less restrictive 
interpretation in the future if the principle of self-determination itself undergoes an 
evolution and comes to be interpreted in a wider fashion.169  However, as Greenwood 
points out:  'It is...widely accepted that that has not yet happened and can only occur if 
the practice of States in this regard undergoes considerable change.'170 
 
It is not only Article 1 (4) that contains restrictive elements.  Article 96 (3) will also be 
difficult to satisfy.  A declaration made by a national liberation movement / authority 
under Article 96 (3) will only bring the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I into 
application over a certain conflict if two elements are satisfied.  Firstly, the conditions of 
Article 1 (4) must be met, i.e., the 'people' on whose behalf the national liberation 
movements claims to be fighting is actually a 'people' who are struggling against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and racist regimes in exercising their right of self-
determination and the national liberation movement must, in fact, represent this people.  
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Because of the restrictiveness of Article 1 (4), Protocol I has only ever been recognised as 
formally applicable in one conflict, that being the conflict between Peru and Ecuador, 
even though, as Greenwood comments: 
 
…it should have been treated as applicable to at least some aspects of the 
fighting in the former Yugoslavia and many of its most important provisions 
were applied as rules of customary international law in the Kuwait conflict.171 
 
The Protocol which was especially amended for and tailored to the needs of wars of 
national liberation has never actually been applied to such a conflict.  What then was the 
point of the controversy at the Diplomatic Conference of 1974 - 77 and the amendment of 
Article 1 (4)?  Schlindler accepts that Article 1 (4) and 96 (3) will rarely, if ever, apply to 
a conflict, yet he goes on to comment that: 
 
Nevertheless, the provisions of Protocol I on wars of national liberation will 
probably not remain without effect altogether.  They have reinforced the 
international position of liberation movements.  The States which accede to 
Protocol I thereby implicitly recognize the legitimacy and legality of wars of 
liberation.  This will increase the pressure on the States involved in wars of 
national liberation to apply the Geneva Conventions.172 
 
This comment was made in 1979.  Since then, many conflicts have taken place between 
national liberation movements and the established government, yet humanitarian law 
protection has not been afforded too frequently in these situations.  Case law regarding 
members of national liberation movements / 'terrorists' has illustrated the reluctance of 
States to apply the Geneva Conventions in this type of situation as well as the 
unpredictability of application.173 While in some cases, Israeli courts have indicated that 
in certain instances members of certain organisations, e.g. the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) could be considered as prisoners-of-war, especially if 
wearing a 'uniform' and involved in military activities when captured, other cases have 
taken a different view.  In the case of Military Prosecutor v Omar Mahmud Kassem and 
Others174 for example, the Israeli court stated: 
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No government with which we are in a state of war accepts responsibility for the 
acts of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.  The Organization 
itself, so far as we know, is not prepared to take orders from the Jordan 
government, witness the fact that it is illegal in Jordan and has been repeatedly 
harassed by the Jordan authorities.  The measure that Jordan has (sic) adopted 
against it has included the use of arms...If these authorities look upon a body 
such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine as an illegal 
organization, why must we have to regard it as a body to which international 
rules relating to lawful bodies are acceptable?175 
 
In the case of The State v Sagarius and Others,176 the judge was asked to consider the 
case of three people - members of SWAPO - who had been found guilty of participating 
in terrorist activities.  Twenty-two members of SWAPO, including the accused, had 
infiltrated South West African territory from Angola, carrying arms.  They then split into 
smaller groups and all except the accused were killed or expelled from the territory.  The 
judge commented: 
 
It is common knowledge that the members of the group were clad in a 
characteristic uniform worn by the armed wing of SWAPO, and that their 
contacts with the Defence Force occurred in what could be described as a war 
situation.177 
 
They began to retreat but were captured and taken prisoner.  The judge continued:  
'Considering all the circumstances; they probably regarded their actions as part of a 
legitimate conflict which enjoyed strong support both at home and abroad.'178 
 
The judge agreed with evidence given by Professor Dugard which stated that even though 
there is a tendency in international law to confer prisoner-of-war status on prisoners who 
have participated in an armed conflict against a colonial, racist or alien regime while 
wearing a characteristic uniform, governments who do not accept Protocol I are not 
bound to confer such status, and he went on to question the customary law value of 
Protocol I.  He nevertheless believed that the consensus in international law regarding 
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such conferring of status should be taken into account at sentencing.  Two of the accused 
were given nine-year sentences and the third was given an eleven-year sentence.179 
 
There is no established predictable practice regarding the application of the principles of 
international humanitarian law in conflicts involving national liberation movements.  
Indeed, as pointed out by Green: 
 
At the time NATO instituted its bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 
there was no suggestion the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) was a national 
liberation movement, even though its avowed aim was self-determination and 
independence.  In fact, only a year earlier western powers were describing the 
KLA as gangs of terrorists.180 
 
Therefore, despite the promising outcomes of the Diplomatic Conference of 1974 - 77, , 
little progress has taken place in practical terms of implementation of international 
humanitarian law in conflicts involving movements of national liberation.  While articles 
1 (4), 96 (3) and 44 of Protocol are to be welcomed as a long awaited political victory,181 
it is the practical legal implications which are needed to ensure adequate protection for 
those involved in wars of national liberation.  If Protocol I is to be of any practical use to 
those involved in national liberation movements in the future, then... 
 
...there is need to look at the Protocol as a dynamic instrument not only 
restricted to the categories of situation named therein, but to other self-
determination situations which may not be readily characterisable in terms of the 
conventional criteria.182 
   
However, this analysis of past State practice and the reluctance of States to formally 
recognise the application of international humanitarian law provisions to conflicts 
involving national liberation movements, illustrates that a development of this type is 
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doubtful.
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Additional Protocol II and Wars of National Liberation  
Protocol II of 1977 supplements and develops common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, dealing with non-international conflicts.  It may seem quite unusual 
therefore, after charting the progress made by certain countries and national liberation 
movements in having wars of national liberation recognised as international conflicts, 
that this chapter would seek to analyse how Protocol II regarding non-international 
conflicts could possibly apply to conflicts of this type.  Yet, as discussed in the previous 
Chapter, Protocol I has never been deemed to be applicable to a war of national 
liberation.  As also discussed, there are divergent opinions regarding the scope of the 
application of Protocol I as laid down in Article 1 (4), especially regarding the word 
'include', and the scope of application has been seen to be very restrictive.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to consider all other options open to national liberation movements - one of 
these options being Protocol II, i.e. could a national liberation movement in conflict with 
the established government benefit from the application of Protocol II? 
 
 
Provisions relevant to Wars of National Liberation 
Many delegations at the 1974 - 1977 Diplomatic Conference had reservations regarding 
the idea of a Protocol devoted explicitly to non-international armed conflicts, e.g. China 
and India along with several Latin American and African countries.183  These delegations 
wanted to restrict the scope of application of the Protocol as much as possible.  The ICRC 
draft Protocol II contained 47 articles, but the legislative process saw many discussions, 
changes and compromises.  The end result was a greatly reduced Protocol of 28 Articles.  
At the last session of the Conference in 1977, the Protocol which emerged from the 
Committee stage had been actually 'even more elaborate'184 than the ICRC draft, 
following the template of Protocol I.  It was obvious at this stage that such a Protocol 
would not be adopted by the requisite two-thirds majority at the plenary session.  The 
delegates, fearful of a complete failure, were quite happy to accept a simplified draft 
Protocol proposed by the Pakistani delegation. 
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Article 1 of Protocol II lays down the 'material field of application' of the Protocol, i.e. 
the conflicts to which the Protocol would be applicable.  Article 1 states: 
 
1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing 
conditions of application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not 
covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting 
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a 
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted 
military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a 
similar nature, as not being armed conflicts. 
 
Regarding this Article the ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols states: 
 
This provision constitutes the keystone of the instrument.  It is the result of a 
delicate compromise, the product of lengthy negotiations, and the fate of the 
Protocol as a whole depended on it until it was finally adopted in the plenary 
meetings of the Conference.185 
 
A very important aspect to be noted with regard to this Article is the kind of situation not 
included in the scope - the article does not apply in cases of internal disturbance.  The 
ICRC Commentary elaborates on this by stating: 
 
...there are internal disturbances, without being an armed conflict, when the 
State uses armed force to maintain order; there are internal tensions, without 
being internal disturbances, when force is used as a preventative measure to 
maintain respect for law and order.186 
 
According to Article 1 of Protocol II, the Protocol also only applies to situations of 
conflicts between a dissident group and the central government - not between two or 
more dissident groups - therefore, this makes the scope of application of Protocol II 
narrower than that of Common Article 3.  However, with regard to a conflict between a 
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national liberation movement and an established government, which is of concern to the 
present study, Protocol II could apply. 
 
Combatant and Prisoner-of-War Status 
Unlike Protocol I, Protocol II does not confer either combatant or prisoner-of-war status 
on a member of any insurgent group.  Municipal law still remains in force in situations 
where Protocol II is applicable.  The authorities of the State can still prosecute and 
sentence anyone who is found guilty of any offence which relates to the conflict e.g. the 
taking up of arms and the use of force by the insurgent group / national liberation 
movement.  Rwelamira comments that: 
 
Protocol II has in effect restated the general rule of international law relating to 
the status of belligerency.  Before a situation assumes such a status, the conflict 
is to be considered as a purely domestic affair.  The fighters are not regarded as 
combatants and they are not entitled to the prisoner of wars status if they fall 
into the hands of the enemy.187 
 
Obviously this protection offered by Protocol I regarding combatants and prisoners-of-
war, discussed in Chapter 4, is to be much favoured.  If a national liberation movement 
does not, or cannot, make a declaration under Article 96 (3) of Protocol I and engages in 
a conflict with the forces of the established government which meets the criteria of 
Article 1 of Protocol II, the national liberation movement's 'combatants' are offered no 
protection.  Yet, the acceptance of a declaration under Article 96 (3) of Protocol I by the 
depositary from a national liberation movement in a similar conflict situation would 




Protocol II applies only to conflicts that have passed a specified threshold of intensity.  
Once this threshold is passed, the Protocol applies to the conflict in question.  The 
applicability of Protocol II is automatic - no declaration has to be made by the parties to 
the conflict as long as the requirements of Article 1 are met.  Regarding this aspect of 
Protocol II Green comments: 
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There is no provision on the Protocol enabling a revolutionary authority to 
accede thereto, but if the governmental authority has already taken this step it is 
effective for all the inhabitants of the state.  In the event of a non-international 
conflict affecting such a state, the Protocol will apply automatically.188 
  
Abi-Saab comments on the same issue: 
 
...once the protocol is internationally accepted in the name of the State by its 
government, it becomes part of the law of the land, and thus binds both 
individuals and government, including any actual or future government, as well 
as any counter movement which disputes the representativity or the authority of 
such government.189 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Common Article 3 lacks clarity regarding definition of its 
threshold.  This uncertainty has given rise to many interpretations that has often led to a 
denial of its applicability to a conflict.  In order to remedy this situation and to improve 
the protection of victims of non-international conflicts it was necessary to develop rules 
and define objective criteria to determine applicability of Protocol II.  The discussions 
and debate surrounding suitable rules and criteria for applicability of Protocol II were 
long and intense.  While it was realised that uncertainty regarding definition often led to 
the denial of applicability of Article 3, it was also realised that too strict and rigid a 
definition could mean that States would not apply Protocol II either.  Thirteen different 
proposals, encompassing six varying approaches, regarding the scope of application of 
the Protocol were discussed at the Conference of Government Experts in Geneva, to be 
considered by the ICRC.  The ICRC's eventual proposal contained a broad definition 
based on the existence of a confrontation between armed forces or other organised armed 
groups who were under responsible command, showing a minimum degree of 
organisation,190 and the established government.  The criteria which would be incumbent 
on the insurgents were finally agreed upon, i.e. responsible command, enough control 
over part of the territory which enables them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and the ability to implement the Protocol, and were laid down in the above-
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quoted Article 1.  The ICRC commentary on the Additional Protocols states regarding 
these criteria: 
 
In practical terms, if the insurgent armed groups are organized in accordance 
with the requirements of the Protocol, the extent of territory they can claim to 
control will be that which escapes the control of the government armed forces.  
However, there must be some degree of stability in the control of even a modest 
area of land for them to be capable of effectively applying the rules of the 
Protocol.191 
 
To date however, no recognised national liberation movement has been in control of any 
part of national territory as required by Protocol II,192 with many national liberation 
movements having their 'base' outside of the 'parent' State. 
 
Obviously, these criteria restrict the scope of application of the Protocol to conflicts of a 
high intensity only.  Therefore, only very few non-international conflicts are covered by 
Protocol II.  The International Committee of the Red Cross had intended that Additional 
Protocol II would supplement and develop the rules of Common Article 3 because up to 
then it had been made obvious by the death and destruction caused by various non-
international conflicts that the pre-existing provisions were not effective enough.  
However, at the Geneva Conference it was decided that the threshold of Protocol II 
should actually be raised because of a fear of an infringement on State sovereignty.193  
Therefore, the applicability of the Protocol is only possible if the dissidents control some 
territory and if they have the ability to implement the Protocol.  If, in the course of the 
conflict, the dissidents lose this control or the ability to apply the Protocol, the Protocol is 
no longer applicable.  Therefore, Protocol II provides for the very unsatisfactory position 
that  'the question of applicability of Protocol II might be answered varyingly, according 
to the prevailing circumstances.'194  Despite the efforts made to clarify the issue of the 
threshold of Protocol II, much ambiguity still surrounds this topic.  Protocol II does not 
clearly state how much territory must be under the control of the non-government party to 
the conflict.  Also unclear is what actually constitutes 'implementation' of the Protocol by 
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the rebel forces.  Much is left up to the discretion of the State, which is not a very 
satisfactory position.  As Rwelamira states:  
 
If States are allowed to characterise a situation and in accordance with the 
dictates of their individual disposition, then the broader base of humanitarian 
concerns may be sacrificed in the process.195 
 
However, Schlindler points out that: 
 
Practice has set up the following criteria to delimit non-international armed 
conflicts from internal disturbances.  In the first place, the hostilities have to be 
conducted by force of arms and exhibit such intensity that, as a rule, the 
government is compelled to employ its armed forces against the insurgents 
instead of mere police forces.  Secondly, as to the insurgents, the hostilities are 
meant to be of a collective character, that is, they have to be carried out not only 
by single groups.  In addition, the insurgents have to exhibit a minimum amount 
of organization.  Their armed forces should be under a responsible command 
and be capable of meeting humanitarian requirements.  Accordingly the conflict 
must show certain similarities to a war without fulfilling all conditions necessary 
for the recognition of belligerency.196 
 
Green concludes that: 
The definition of a non-international armed conflict in protocol II has a 
threshold that is so high on fact, that it would exclude most revolutions and 
rebellions, and would probably not operate in a civil war until the rebels were 
well established and had set up some form of de facto government, as had been 
the case with the nationalist revolution in Spain.197 
 
Indeed, Protocol II was not applied to the conflicts that took place in the Soviet Union or 
Yugoslavia prior to the dissolution of these States.  This was the case even though 
recognition of States such as Croatia and Slovenia by some third States implied the 
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Conclusion 
Additional Protocol II was applicable to internal conflicts in El Salvador, the Philippines, 
Rwanda and to aspects of the fighting in the former Yugoslavia,198 but has never been 
deemed to be applicable in a situation of conflict between a national liberation movement 
and the central government.  As Greenwood comments, Protocol II is to be welcomed.  
He states: 
 
Additional Protocol II goes a long way to putting flesh on the bare bones of 
common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  In particular, Additional 
Protocol II contains the first attempt to regulate by treaty the methods and means 
of warfare in internal conflicts.199 
 
However, the high level of intensity of conflict required for Protocol II to be triggered has 
meant that it will very rarely be applied.  The above analysis of Protocol II however, 
illustrates that it could possibly apply to situations of conflict between a national 
liberation movement and the established government.  If a national liberation movement 
could prove that they had an organised command system and exercised requisite control 
over territory to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and that they were 
involved in a conflict with a High Contracting Party, then Protocol II should apply 
automatically to the conflict.  Some national liberation movements could perhaps be able 
to prove they meet these criteria,200 yet, the applicability of Protocol II to any conflict 
involving a national liberation movement has always been denied.  As with the case of 
Common Article 3, established governments are very reluctant to admit the existence of 
any type of conflict within their borders, preferring to prize their State sovereignty over 
humanitarian concerns and apply only municipal criminal law to the 'terrorists'.  Yet, if 
the criteria for the application of Protocol II could be met in a situation of conflict 
between a national liberation movement and the established government, what benefits 
are to be gained by the national liberation movement?  Both Common Article 3 and 
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Protocol can apply simultaneously to a conflict, providing for the minimum amount of 
protection, but as Abi-Saab comments: 
 
Where protocol II comes into its own is in the substantive protection, it provides 
through its much greater, and greatly needed, elaboration of the elliptic 
declarations of principle of common article 3, and through introducing new 
fundamental rules concerning the protection of civilians against the effects of 
hostilities, as well as the protection of medical personnel and transports.201 
 
Therefore, while not satisfactory by any means in the light of the existence of an 
especially-tailored Protocol I, those involved in a conflict between a national liberation 
movement and the forces of the established government could benefit from the 
application of Protocol II.  The civilians caught up unwittingly in the hostilities would 
benefit.  The 'freedom fighters' however, would still be regarded as 'terrorists' and 
criminals.  However, as Rwelamira comments:  'Individual States are...left with a carte 
blanche to decide when the Protocol or common Article 3 should be invoked.'202 
 
This means that the Protocol will be invoked only rarely.  Again, however, Protocol II 
has never been deemed applicable to a situation of conflict between a national liberation 
movement and the established government.  While this Chapter has illustrated that the 
option is there for application in theory, in reality, it has never been seen to be politically 
expedient to recognise such application. 
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Analysis 
This discussion has illustrated how inadequately international humanitarian law has dealt 
with wars of national liberation.  Such liberation wars have occupied quite a significant 
place in the international political forum for many years; yet have failed to have this 
importance reflected realistically in the practical implementation of the formal framework 
of international humanitarian law. Due to the emotive nature of wars of national 
liberation they have often led to violence of a savage nature and destruction on a large 
scale, yet the seriousness of wars of national liberation, and the fate of those involved in 
these wars, seems to have lost out in the balancing of State sovereignty with humanitarian 
concerns by the international community.   
 
While most of the conflicts classified as wars of national liberation occurred in the period 
of decolonisation of the last century, other wars of national liberation took place at 
various times before this.  These wars had never properly been provided for by 
international law.  International law had taken the stance that wars of this type were 
domestic affairs only and that any incursion into such affairs by third States or by 
international law with regard to this type of conflict would be a violation of State 
sovereignty.  Therefore, international law stayed virtually silent on wars of national 
liberation and indeed on non-international conflicts in general.  The only real effort to 
break this silence was the Lieber Code utilised in the American Civil War.  Chapter 1 of 
this work illustrated that under the traditional international law approach, the only means 
by which a war of national liberation could have benefited from the application of the 
whole corpus of jus in bello was by the recognition of a state of belligerency by either the 
'parent State' or a third State.  However, as discussed in this first Chapter, recognition of 
belligerency in any case of conflict was rarely forthcoming, and if forthcoming at all, was 
usually as a matter of political expediency with either the parent State requiring the 
principle of reciprocity or a third State seeing an opportunity to benefit.  If recognition of 
belligerency came at all, it usually came at a late stage of the conflict with much damage, 
destruction and death already having taken place.  Once a state of belligerency was 
recognised, both sides benefited from the application of the whole scheme of 
international humanitarian law.  This would have benefited those involved in wars of 
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national liberation but no parent or third State ever deemed members of a national 
liberation movement to be belligerents and thus no war of national liberation was ever 
deemed to be open to the application of international humanitarian law.  Wars of national 
liberation were traditionally regarded as internal conflicts falling completely outside the 
remit of international humanitarian law.  As in other situations of non-international 
conflict such as rebellion, these conflicts were dealt with exclusively by municipal law, 
with 'freedom fighters' being treated and tried as criminals.  Some parent States made 
some slight concessions in cases of non-international conflict where such a conflict was 
of a prolonged and sustained character by granting treatment analogous to treatment of 
prisoners-of-war to captured rebels, insurgents or freedom fighters.   
 
Cleary, this approach to wars of national liberation and their victims was extremely 
inadequate.  While one may blame the slow evolution of international law regarding non-
international conflicts for the neglect of wars of national liberation, the fact that there was 
a framework in place which, if somewhat underused, saw for the application of jus in 
bello to serious 'non-international conflicts' by the recognition of belligerency, and that 
this regime was never used with regard to wars of national liberation, proves that the 
international community did not want to deal with wars of national liberation as 
international conflicts.  The international community placed more importance on 
maintaining State sovereignty and power over all parts of their State than on 
humanitarian concerns. 
 
Chapter 2 of this study discussed the need for improvement and development in the laws 
of armed conflict that led to the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  
Unfortunately, the pre-1949 mindset of the pre-eminence of State sovereignty over 
humanitarian concerns prevailed at the Geneva Conference of 1949, with only Common 
Article 3 of the Conventions dealing with non-international conflicts.  Wars of national 
liberation were still categorised as non-international conflicts in 1949, and so this was the 
only provision open to national liberation movements.  Again, this option was 
unsatisfactory.  Chapter 2 highlighted the many criticisms that have been levelled at 
Common Article 3.  The uncertainty surrounding the definition of a conflict not of an 
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international character as well as the confusion regarding threshold and automatic 
applicability has led to many instances of denial of the applicability of Common Article 3 
to a conflict situation.  States will always be reluctant to admit that any sort of conflict 
exists within their boundaries which would trigger the application of international 
humanitarian law as it would infringe on their State sovereignty and confer a legitimacy 
on the rebels or those who contest the State authority.  Therefore, Common Article 3 has 
only rarely been applied to wars of national liberation.  Another issue addressed in 
Chapter 2 was that of the application of the whole of the Geneva Conventions regarding 
conflicts of an international nature to wars of national liberation.  While at the time of 
drafting, such wars were considered to be non-international in character, this opinion 
changed after the adoption of these Conventions.  Chapter 3 dealt with the change in 
opinion of the international community, which, by 1977, had conferred international 
status on wars of national liberation in Protocol I.  Therefore, if an authority representing 
a people fighting a war of national liberation could be seen to be a 'Power' under Article 2 
(3) common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, then the way would be open for the 
application of the whole body of international humanitarian law to wars of national 
liberation.  This idea could be developed and implemented at some future date.  
However, up to this point in time, the 1949 Conventions have not been of too much 
benefit to those involved in wars of national liberation and indeed, when international 
humanitarian law is applied in such a war, it is seen as a matter of concession and not a 
legal obligation. 
 
In the three decades following the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, the instances of 
conflicts termed wars of national liberation gained in frequency and importance.  The 
period of decolonisation saw various struggles for self-determination giving rise to many 
complex problems.  Many of these problems arose in the legal field.  The growing 
importance of wars of national liberation and the legal quandary to which they gave rise 
was obvious at the Diplomatic Conference of 1974 - 77 discussed in Chapter 3.  An 
analysis of the many statements and resolutions of the UN and other regional 
organisations in the years preceding the conference illustrates that the belief held at the 
time of the 1949 Geneva Conference that wars of national liberation were non-
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international conflicts had changed.  Declarations such as the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations showed that change was needed in the legal sphere and that wars of national 
liberation should be legally recognised as conflicts of an international character.  The 
very emotive issues of self-determination and decolonisation coupled with these 
resolutions and declarations made for an interesting Conference.  It was quite foreseeable 
and understandable that there was to be much debate on wars of national liberation, 
especially on the status of these wars.   
 
Chapters 4 and 5 discussed the outcomes of this Diplomatic Conference.  The passage of 
Article 1 (4) of Protocol I was a major political victory for national liberation movements 
and for the 'cause' of wars of national liberation.  Nonetheless, it has to be said that this 
political victory has not been transformed into real legal protection for those involved in 
wars of national liberation.  Chapter 4 illustrated the narrow, restrictive scope of Article 1 
(4) of Protocol I and the difficulties regarding accession under Article 96 (3), which have 
resulted in the fact that no war of national liberation has ever benefited from Protocol I. 
 
Chapter 5 illustrated that even if a conflict between a national liberation movement and 
the forces of an established government was treated as a non-international conflict, 
Protocol II could deal with not every conflict of this type.  This is as a result of the very 
high threshold of application laid down in Article 1.  This has meant that, to date, no 
conflict involving a national liberation movement has been deemed to fall within the 
remit of Protocol II. 
 
This whole discussion has shown that the practical applicability of international 
humanitarian law to wars of national liberation has been rendered almost void by political 
reluctance.  While, in theory, recognition of belligerency in a war of national liberation 
could trigger the application of jus in bello, and while in theory Common Article 3 and 
indeed Protocol II could be applied to wars of national liberation if they meet certain 
criteria, this very rarely, if ever, happens.  Even Protocol I with its own provisions 
specifically tailored to wars of national liberation has never been invoked with regard to 
such wars.  As discussed in Chapter 2 the possibility also exists that if a national 
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liberation movement could prove itself to be a 'Power' within the meaning of the Geneva 
Conventions, they could apply and agree to be bound by these Conventions.  However, 
this study has been a theoretical exercise.  In reality States usually deny the existence of 
wars of national liberation.  The strategy of preferring to classify such conflicts as 
internal disturbances or indeed manifestations of terrorism, and to deal with them under 
municipal law helps preserve their State sovereignty.  If they concede to apply 
international humanitarian law, then it is a manifestation of their humanitarianism, not a 
matter of a legal obligation 
 
While many groups such as the PLO and the KLA would classify themselves as national 
liberation movements, and would believe themselves to be entitled to protection under 
the Geneva Conventions or Protocol I, they have not generally succeeded in gaining 
formal recognition of the application of these legal instruments to their struggles except 
in very rare cases.  As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4, some national liberation 
movements have shown their willingness to apply and to be bound by international 
humanitarian law in their conflicts against the established government.  An example of 
this is the fact that the IRA had expressed their intention to make an Article 96 (3) 
Declaration and so be bound by Protocol I at the Diplomatic Conference of 1974 - 77.  
Other national liberation movements such as the PLO, the ANC, the FLN and SWAPO 
have also made statements regarding their willingness to be bound by international 
humanitarian law.  Yet, as it stands, no national liberation movement can automatically 
benefit from international humanitarian law.  While in theory there are a number of 
options open to national liberation movements, in reality, wars of national liberation have 
only rarely seen the benefit of the application of international humanitarian law.  As 
illustrated in this paper, States are very unwilling to recognise that any type of conflict 
exists within their borders, as they do not wish for interference from outside.  State 
sovereignty is all-important. The emphasis and importance placed on State sovereignty 
has been to the detriment of humanitarian protection of those involved in wars of national 
liberation.  States usually view those actively involved in national liberation movements 
as 'terrorists' and criminals.  This attitude is not to anyone's benefit.  By refusing to 
acknowledge a Common Article 3 or a Protocol II conflict situation, the State's own 
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civilians fail to benefit from the protective measures embodied in these provisions.  By 
failing to acknowledge a Protocol I conflict situation, States are denying legitimacy to 
national liberation movements as well as the right of these movements to fulfil their wish, 
and indeed, right of self-determination as accepted by the UN and the international 
community.  They are also effectively denying many innocent people the right to benefit 
from the protection of international humanitarian law.  If national liberation movements 
could be allowed to agree to, be bound by and apply Protocol I and the Geneva 
Conventions and benefit from reciprocity, this could only result in less death, damage, 
and destruction.  States realised that international humanitarian law should cover wars of 
national liberation.  They even went as far as enshrining this political belief in legal 
doctrine.  However, they have not yet taken the final step of balancing State sovereignty 
and humanitarian concerns in favour of the latter by applying the formal framework 
available for situations of wars of national liberation to these conflicts.  As long as this 
situation continues, States could be said to be forcing national liberation movements to 
live outside the formal framework of international humanitarian law, and this can only be 
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